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UCITA: UNIFORMITY AT THE PRICE OF
FAIRNESS?
Ajay Ayyappan*
"At the development's start, both the insight and experience
necessary to create a statute are lacking. A statute passed under such
circumstances is a far greater misfortune than any misstep taken by a
case law court."'
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Karl Llewellyn and others drafted the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC").2 The UCC was initially adopted to
reflect the transition of the American economy from one based on
agrarian production to one centered on the sale of goods. The UCC's
primary goal was to simplify the law governing commercial
transactions and to make that law uniform.' In this respect, the UCC
has been hailed a success.5 All fifty states have adopted it to varying
degrees. 6
The UCC, however, is beginning to show its age as the American
economy has again evolved.7 The modern American economy is
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents and family for their constant love and support and Professor Michael J. Lane
for teaching me how to write.
1. Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America 67 (Paul Gewirtz ed.,
Michael Ansaldi trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1989) (1933).
2. John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretations and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 263, 267-68 (2000) (noting Llewellyn's role in the development of the
UCC).
3. Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law- What Lasv Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1999); see also Pratik A. Shah,
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 Berkeley Tech. LIJ. 85, 85
(2000) (discussing the original role of the UCC).
4. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for
Electronic Commerce Or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 Berkeley Tech. LJ.
635, 646 (1999).
5. Id. at 647.
6. Id. at 647 n.46.
7. Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA: A Commercial Contract Code, Computer Law.,
May 2000, at 3. 3 [hereinafter Nimmer, UCITA] ("Our economy today has
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primarily centered around information and information services. 8
Computer information transactions constitute a crucial part of the
new economy. These transactions involve service contracts and the
licensing of intangible goods, areas the UCC's antiquated provisions
are ill-equipped to address. 9 For example, the UCC fails to cover
common situations such as the licensing of software 10 and the
enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses." This legislative gap has forced
courts to apply the UCC to transactions it was never meant to
address.12 The following hypothetical illustrates the current dilemma:
You walk into a retail store and purchase the latest word processing
program for your computer. After bringing the software home, you
tear off the shrink-wrap and open the box. Inside there is a piece of
paper written in a font so small you can barely see it and in language
so dense you can barely understand it. Tossing the paper aside, you
proceed to install the program. Shortly thereafter, you are
interrupted by a screen prompt asking you to agree to various terms
that resemble those on the paper. Seeking to use the program
immediately, you click through all the prompts. A few days later,
while using the software, it malfunctions and your files are corrupted.
What are your warranty rights in this situation? Will the software
company fix your files and replace the program? If the files contained
crucial data for your small business can you sue for damages? Are
you bound by the terms in the shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses?
Unfortunately the answers to these questions cannot be found in the
UCC. The UCC warranty provisions have been inconsistently applied
to software transactions. 3 Indeed, some courts and commentators
argue that the UCC itself is wholly inapplicable to these transactions.14
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")
is a legislative attempt to remedy these situations. Originally
proposed as Article 2B of the UCC, UCITA was intended to be a link
between the UCC and the new information economy. 5 During the
drafting process, however, serious disagreements arose regarding
experienced another fundamental change: the information revolution. Information
and information services are now the center of the economy.").
8. Id. (noting that "[almong the changes [in the economy] that this causes is a
wildly diverse array of methods of distributing and tailoring digital information to
form information products and resources that fit the modem marketplace").
9. Id. ("Article 2 works well for sales of manufactured goods, but was developed
50 years ago for goods, not for commerce in computer information.").
10. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 261-81 and accompanying text.
12. Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act, Prefatory Note (July 1999 Draft)
[hereinafter UCITA].
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra notes 38-74 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy over
whether software is a good for the purposes of UCC coverage).
15. Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer Friendly, 18 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. L. 547, 547-49 (1999).
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several of the proposed provisions. 6 Much of the criticism concerned
what many groups believed to be the anti-consumer/pro-industry
stance of the statute.17  Eventually, the American Legal Institute
("ALI") withdrew its support of UCITA because of its pro-industry
stance, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") proceeded on its own.' The project was
then renamed UCITA. 19
UCITA suffers from the same criticism that plagued Article 2B."'j
The statute's warranty provisions have come under particular
scrutiny.2' Opponents of the statute charge that these provisions give
too much power to software publishers and weaken existing consumer
protection laws.' z For example, these critics assert that UCITA's
language makes it easier for software publishers to escape liability
from express warranties by demonstration.' Additionally, they have
attacked UCITA's disclaimer provisions as being too liberal and
thereby alloing vendors to disclaim warranties without providing
adequate notice to the consumer.24 Furthermore, critics contend that
UCITA removes software transactions from existing consumer
protection statutes.- Finally, they also note that UCITA's scope is
overbroad and thus threatens to extend its unfavorable terms to
transactions normally governed by the UCC and other existing
statutes.26
Proponents of UCITA argue that its opponents misunderstand the
statute's provisions.27  They first point out that UCITA was not
intended to be a piece of consumer protection legislation,' rather the
statute's primary purpose is to facilitate computer information
transactions by removing the ambiguities in the current law.'
Consumer protections, they argue, should be left to statutes
specifically drafted for that purpose.3' Furthermore, UCITA's
proponents note that its warranty provisions reflect a necessary
change that addresses the commercial realities in the new economy. 1
16. Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, Computer Law., May 2000, at
20, 20.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Rustad, supra note 15, at 547-49 (noting the transition from 2B to UCITA
and that both statutes have been the subject of extensive criticism).
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra notes 383-404 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 405-13 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 419-26 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 427-33 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 455-96 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 455-70 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 455-71 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 455-71 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 497-99 and accompanying text.
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Finally, proponents assert that the current lack of uniformity in the
law necessitates UCITA's passage.32
This Note will argue that the UCITA's warranty structure provides
inadequate protection for consumers and invites regulation. Part I
presents the existing law regarding software and information service
warranties by discussing the current application of the UCC and the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to computer information transactions.
Part II examines the arguments regarding UCITA's warranty
structure. Finally, Part III of this Note argues that states should
modify the UCITA to remedy areas where it falls short in protecting
consumer interests. Part III also advocates for the creation of a
federal consumer protection statute that specifically addresses
computer information transactions.
I. THE CURRENT WARRANTY LAW FOR COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS
This part will first discuss the scope of the UCC with respect to
computer information transactions. Second, it will explain the various
UCC warranties and their applicability. Finally, this part will discuss
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and its relevance to the world of
computer information transactions.
A. Scope of the UCC
Article 2 of the UCC deals with "transactions in goods."33 The
subject matter of the transaction therefore determines whether the
UCC will govern in the event of a lawsuit. Section 2-105(1) of the
UCC defines "goods" as "all things ... which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in
action."'  In any computer information transaction, therefore, the
applicability of the UCC hinges on whether a computer transaction
involves the sale of goods.35  Hardware3 6 clearly meets the above
definition of goods and is governed by the UCC.37 Software,3" on the
other hand, presents a much thornier issue.39
32. See infra notes 497-99 and accompanying text.
33. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000).
34. Id. at § 2-105(1).
35. See Marc S. Friedman, Year 2000 Crisis and the Uniform Commercial Code:
The Statute as a Sword and a Shield, Computer Law., Sept. 1998, at 1, 3.
36. Kerry M. L. Smith, Comment, Suing the Provider of Computer Software: How
Courts are Applying U.C.C. Article Two, Strict Tort Liability, and Professional
Malpractice, 24 Willamette L. Rev. 743, 744 (1988) ("Hardware is the part of the
computer that can be seen and felt. Hardware is the equipment that prepares, inputs,
computes, stores, and outputs data.").
37. Joseph P. Zammit, Special Problems in Computer Program and System
Warranties in the Retail Environment, in PLI Course Handbook, Computer Law
Institute 1986, available at WL 230 PLI/Pat 99, 106; see also Friedman, supra note 35,
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Absent an agreement by the parties that Article 2 shall apply to the
transaction, courts must determine whether software is a "good"
subject to the UCC's provisions.4 Unlike hardware, a computer
program is not entirely tangible.41 Software is a type of intellectual
property that is separate from the physical medium that contains it.'
In this respect, software is similar to a record album or compact disc
("CD"). 43 The music and the record or CD are two separate things.'
Furthermore, most software transactions are structured as licenses,"
not sales.46
Although software has many qualities not typically associated with
goods, some of its attributes suggest that it is a "good."'" For example,
software can be "identified, moved, transferred, and sold" like other
products classified as goods.' This ability to exist in dual planes
initially caused considerable judicial uncertainty regarding the UCC's
applicability to software transactions 9  Within the last decade,
at 3 ("Courts have consistently held that computer hardware is a 'good' under the
UCC.").
38. Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L
Rev. 129, 131 (1985) ("Software consists of a computer program or programs
embodied in a physical medium such as paper, magnetic tape, cards, or discs.").
39. See id. at 132; see also Smith, supra note 36, at 747 (noting that software has
characteristics that are both tangible and intangible).
40. Smith, supra note 36, at 748.
41. Id. at 749.
42. Horovitz, supra note 38, at 132 ("When a program becomes software, no
aspect of the intellectual product is altered, and it continues to exist apart from its
encoding medium.").
43. Id at 150 (noting support for the proposition that software is "analogous to
records, cassettes, tapes, and books").
44. See id. at 150-51.
45. Michael D. Scott, Computer Law § 6.20 (4th ed. 1989) (noting that "a software
license is a contract by which the licensor grants to the licensee permission to use the
software in certain ways subject to certain restrictions. Under such an arrangement,
the licensor not only retains full ownership of the software, but can restrict the
licensee's use of the software in many critical respects"); see infra notes 200-03 and
accompanying text.
46. Jean Braucher, Some Basics of Software Contracting, Without Draft UCC
Article 2B, in ALI-ABA Course of Study, The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform
Commercial Code (1998), available at WL SD30 ALI-ABA 475, 479 ("A sale is a
transfer of title for a price .... Software licenses typically do not convey ownership of
intellectual property rights...."); Zammitt, supra note 37, at 112 ("Most personal
computer software is purportedly licensed rather than sold (pursuant to so-called
'shrink-wrap' licenses.")); see also Mark A. Lemley et al., Software and Internet Law
439 (2000) ("Typically, computer software vendors claim that their wares are licensed
rather than sold.").
47. Horovitz, supra note 38, at 149.
48. Id. at 152.
49. Douglas E. Phillips, When Softvare Fails: Emerging Standards of Vendor
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 Bus. Law. 151,157-58 (1994).
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however, the vast majority of courts have reached a judicial consensus
that software is a good for the purposes of the UCC.50
The court in RRX Industries., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., ' for example,
held that software is a good covered by the UCC.12 In RRX, the
parties entered into a contract for the sale and maintenance of a
medical software system.53 Soon after delivery, the system developed
defects that the defendant Lab-Con was unable to remedy.' In
determining what law to apply, the Ninth Circuit used the
predominate factor test55 to hold "the sales aspect of the transaction
predominates," and therefore the system was a "good. 56 The court
found the service and maintenance portion of the contract to be
incidental to the sale of software.57 Interestingly, the court did not
discuss whether software was a good; instead it recited the UCC
definition and relied on the predominant factor test.58
In Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.," the Third Circuit court
extended the RRX court's reasoning by explicitly stating that
computer software is a good covered by Article 2 of the UCC. In
arriving at its decision, the court analogized software to recorded
music.6 The court noted that music itself was not a good, but when
fixed in a tangible medium it becomes merchantable.6" The court
ultimately held that software becomes a good once it is contained
within a floppy disk.62
50. Raymond T. Nimmer, UCC Revisions: Article 2 in the Information Age, in PLI
Course Handbook, Intellectual Property Law Institute: 1995, available at WL 416
PLI/Pat 1005, 1009-10 [hereinafter Nimmer, Information Age] ("The count is five to
one in terms of a decision that holds a software contract to be within Article 2 (the
five count) or not within Article 2 (the one in ratio)."); Phillips, supra note 49, at 157-
58.
51. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
52. See id. at 546-47.
53. Id. at 545.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 546; see also Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the "predominant factor.., is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale,
with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom)").
The predominant factor test determines whether to apply the UCC based on which
part of the transaction dominated. For example, if goods comprise the majority of the
transaction then the UCC applies, however, if services comprise the majority of the
transaction then the UCC does not apply. See id.
56. RRX Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d at 546 ("In determining whether a contract is one
of sale or to provide services we look to the essence of the agreement.... When a sale
predominates, incidental services provided do not alter the basic transaction.").
57. Id.
58. Id. (discussing what constitutes a 'good' by noting that "[tihe California
Commercial Code defines a good as 'all things').
59. 925 F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 675 (noting that an "analogy can be drawn [between a] compact disc
recording" and a computer program).
61. Id.
62. Id.
2476 [Vol. 69
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A twofold rationale fuels the majority consensus that software is
within the scope of the UCC.63 First, the software in these cases is
delivered through a tangible medium.' This focus on the medium of
delivery is problematic, however, in that technology can, and to a
certain extent has, made physical transfers obsolete.15 Second, courts
have favored the uniformity of the UCC over the uncodified, non-
uniform, common law rules.66 This preference is understandable in
that uniform laws are fixed and certain compared to their common
law brethren whose provisions can vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
Although most courts have held that software is a good covered by
the UCC, courts in a small minority of cases have determined that
software transactions are outside the purview of the UCC.67 For
example, in Data Processing Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp.,'
the court found that a contract between a computer programmer
(DPS) and an oil company to create a computer program was not a
sale of goods covered by the UCC.69 Instead, the court held the
parties had entered into a service contract."' The court reasoned that
although the end result of the transaction would be a "physical
manifestation", the actual contract was for DPS's skill and
knowledge.71 The court distinguished this case from the decision in
RRX by noting that in RRX there was an actual pre-packaged
product, whereas the present issue involved no such item.'
Irrespective of Data Processing and its few companion cases,7
however, courts have generally reasoned that software falls within the
UCC's scope.74 The following discussion illustrates how the various
warranties found within the UCC have been applied to computer
information transactions.
63. Nimmer, Information Age, supra note 50, at 1010.
64. Id-
65. Id (describing how a focus on delivery "will be increasingly problematic as
electronic systems move forward and displace a need to transfer tangible copies of
software").
66. Id.; Advent Sys., 925 F.2d at 676 ("The importance of software to the
commercial world and the advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the
U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring inclusion.").
67. Nimmer, Information Age, supra note 50, at 1009-10.
68. 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
69. Id. at 318 ("[T]he facts found by the trial court do not support a conclusion
DPS sold goods to Smith.").
70. Id.
71. Id. at 318-19.
72. Id. at 319.
73. See, e.g., Geotech Energy Corp., v. Gulf States Telecomm. & Info. Sys., Inc.,
788 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that the essence of the contract was for
services); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W. 2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that contract was for services and therefore did not fall under the UCC).
74. Nimmer, Information Age, supra note 50, at 1010.
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B. UCC Warranties
The UCC contains four warranties.75 Of these, the express
warranty, implied warranty of merchantability, and implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose are the most important.76 The
following discussion will examine the application of the above UCC
warranties to the computer information context.
1. The Express Warranty
Under UCC § 2-313, express warranties can be created in a variety
of ways.77 An oral or written affirmation made by the seller is
probably the most typical form of express warranty,78 and it usually
involves a statement of fact or promise relating to the goods in
question.79 The seller does not need to use the word "warrant" for his
statements to fall under section 2-313. 0 All statements made by the
seller, however, do not automatically become express warranties."'
For example, the UCC recognizes the practice of "puffing,"2 which
refers to statements by the seller that are merely his opinion or
commendation.83 The delineation between puffing and warranties is
difficult to draw.' Courts often rely on factors such as whether the
statement is oral or written, the specificity of the statement, and the
context in which it is spoken to determine whether it is merely puffing
or an express warranty.85
75. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-1,
at 478 (4th ed. 1995).
76. Id. (explaining the relative importance of the UCC warranties).
77. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2000) providing in relevant part:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or the model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
78. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-4, at 486.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 487.
81. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2000); White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-4, at 487.
82. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-4 at 487.
83. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1995)).
84. Id.
85. See id. (comparing different types of statements and whether they can be
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Moreover, express warranties are not limited to verbal
representations by the seller.8 6 Advertisements, samples, and models
can also create a warranty.' For an advertisement to become a
warranty the buyer must show he read and relied on it before making
the transaction.' In general, whenever a seller places an item on
display as a sample or model of the actual product, he creates an
express warranty8 9 because the consumer expects that the qualities of
the sample will be the same as the qualities of the actual product.'
Expert testimony about trade usage determines whether the actual
goods are similar enough to the sample/model.9
Once the court determines that the seller has made an affirmation
of fact or promise relating to the goods, the seller must prove that the
statement became part of the "basis of the bargain."' Prior to the
UCC, the buyer had to prove reliance on the seller's affirmation to
recover on an express warranty claim.93 The UCC, however, makes
no reference to reliance.' Consequently, courts and scholars have
had difficulty interpreting the meaning of this phrase. Some courts
have ruled that "basis of the bargain" means the buyer must
demonstrate reliance on the seller's affirmations,96 while other courts
have ruled that reliance is not required by the term.' Arguably, the
construed as express warranties).
86. Id. § 9-6, at 499.
87. Id. § 9-5, at 494-95; § 9-6, at 499; see, e.g., Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc.
v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Constr., Inc., 831 P.2d 724, 731 (Wash. 1992) (holding that a
brochure purporting building would be of "highest quality" created an express
warranty).
88. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-5, at 495 (explaining how a plaintiff must
show he relied on the "advertisement in making the purchase"); see also Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146-47 (Ark. 1992) (noting that a farmer who had not
read the advertisement could not use it as a basis for creation of an express warranty
and stating "[w]hen a buyer is not influenced by the statement in making his or her
purchase, the statement is not a basis of the bargain").
89. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (2000).
90. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-6, at 499-501.
91. Id § 9-6, at 502 (explaining that because "no sample or model is truly a literal
reproduction of the good itself... it will take at least some expert testimony... to
enable the court or the jury to make a judgment").
92. Id. § 9-5, at 491-92.
93. Id. § 9-5, at 491 (contrasting the law under the Uniform Sales Act with the
"basis of the bargain" requirement under the UCC).
94. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (omitting mention of the term reliance).
95. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-5, at 491-93; John E. Murray Jr., "Basis
of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 Minn. L Rev. 283,283-84 (1982).
96. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1974) (reversing
directed verdict for seller on grounds that evidence tending to prove reliance could be
inferred by a jury).
97. See, e.g., Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 1991)
(noting that reliance is not required); Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
788 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Kan. 1992)(same); see also White & Summers, supra note
75, § 9-5, at 493 n.3 (discussing how "the extent to which prior law has been changed
by 2-313 ... is unclear").
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language of UCC § 2-313 creates a presumption that the seller's
affirmations create an express warranty.98
Express warranties do not arise differently in computer related
transactions than they do in other contracts. 99 The majority of
computer law cases finding a breach of an express warranty involve
statements made by the seller concerning the performance of the
computer system.1°° For example, a seller might make assertions
concerning the speed of a computer, or the capabilities of a software
program.101 These statements then form the basis for an express
warranty. °2 The typical express warranty in a computer contract
provides that "hardware is 'free from defects in material and
workmanship.' ... [and] that software 'performs substantially in
accordance' with... functional specifications."' 3
While the formation of express warranties in computer contracts
remains, relatively unchanged in relation to regular contracts,
enforcement of these warranties presents unique problems in the
computer information context. 1°4 Due to the complicated nature of
computer hardware and software, it is difficult for the buyer to prove
that a malfunction constitutes a breach of warranty.105 Courts have
not yet come to a consensus as to whether the buyer must prove a
relationship between the malfunction and a warranty to prove his
claim. 1°6 The difficulty in proving any such relationship depends on
the specificity of the seller's statement. For example, if the seller
warrants that a computer system will be "free of defects" for ninety
98. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-5, at 493.
99. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 4 (describing where express warranties have
been found in computer law decisions and explaining that an "express warranty may
be created orally as well as in writing .... Express warranties relating to specific
performance standards or to the general suitability of the computer system are often
found in advertising brochures and literature, and vendor's proposals"); see also
Dennis S. Deutsch, The "Demo" as the Basis of the Fraud and Breach of Contract
Claim, Computer Law., May 1991, at 22, 22 (explaining how a seller's demonstration
of a computer product can give rise to an express warranty).
100. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 4.
101. See id. (claiming vendor's statements of "performance specifications" are the
basis of express warranties).
102. Id.
103. Diane Wilkins Savage, Performance Warranties in Computer Contracts,
Computer Law., Dec. 1991, at 32,32.
104. Barbara Chretien-Dar, Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Disclaiming the
Express Warranty in Computer Contracts-Taking the Byte Out of the UCC, 40 Okla. L.
Rev. 471, 483 (1987) ("Although the Code provides for the relatively uncomplicated
creation of express warranties.., the computer vendee will often encounter serious
impediments in attempting to prove.., breach of warranty.").
105. See id. (describing how it is difficult to locate the problem and show a
connection to the warranty). One commentator noted, "[a]s users become more
sophisticated ... the evidentiary problem of proving causation may become
hopelessly confusing." Id. at 484.
106. Id. at 483-84 (discussing the contrasting positions in Bruffey Contracting Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1269 (D. Md. 1981), and Carl Beasley Ford,
Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
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days, such a statement would encompass a broad array of possible
malfunctions. 7  A narrower warranty, however, stating that the
software would only be free of defects affecting the material (e.g., the
floppy disk containing the software) and not the actual functions of
the program, would exclude many potential problems from its
coverage.
A second area in which computer cases have received disparate
treatment is the disclaimer of express warranties."" In general, courts
have held that express warranties cannot be disclaimed," and this
interpretation of the Code stems from the language of section 2-
316(1).11° In relevant part, UCC § 2-316 provides that when the terms
of an express warranty conflict with those of a disclaimer, the
disclaimer will be unenforceable.' The official comment to the Code
explains that "'[e]xpress' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the
individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that
words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered
terms.
, 112
Express warranties that conflict with disclaimers, however, have
been treated differently in computer related cases. 13 In these cases,
courts have taken the opposite interpretation and allowed disclaimers
of express warranties.114  Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp.Y5 provides one of the earliest examples in this line of cases."
107. See &L at 482 (explaining how the phrase "free of defects" was construed by a
court as warranting "that the equipment would operate properly").
108. Id- at 488 (discussing how courts have allowed express warranties to be
disclaimed in computer-related cases, but not in non-computer cases).
109. N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405,412-13 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that disclaimer of warranties is ineffective because it conflicts with an
express warranty created by buyer specifications); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes,
Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 1983); Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 488; see also
Friedman, supra note 35, at 6 ("Most courts have held that it is nearly impossible to
disclaim an express warranty."); Phillips, supra note 49, at 160 (stating that "if the
writing contains express warranties... and also contains a blanket disclaimer of the
express warranties, the disclaimer is invalid"); Savage, supra note 103, at 33 (noting
that courts are unlikely to enforce disclaimers that attempt to invalidate express
warranties).
110. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 486-87.
111. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2000) provides in relevant part:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other, but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
112. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (2000).
113. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 488.
114. Id. Although the following cases concern hardware transactions, their
decisions are not based solely on that fact. See infra note, 115-25 and accompanying
text.
115. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
116. Id.; see also Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 541,543-44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972) (noting that all warranties whether express or implied may be disclaimed in a
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In Investors, the plaintiff Investors Premium Corp. entered into a
contract for computer hardware and later sued on a breach of
warranty claim.117  The plaintiff asserted that the hardware
manufactured and sold for use in its business did not perform as
warranted by the defendant."' The defendant, however, relied on a
disclaimer, which conflicted with the express warranty." 9 The court
acknowledged that the defendant had made an express warranty. 21 ,
Nonetheless, the court refused to enforce the warranty and based its
ruling in part on the contract's broad disclaimer clause, which it found
to supersede any warranty made by the defendant.'21 The court also
rested its decision on the presence of a merger clause1 22 within the
contract, which under the parol evidence rule"2 invalidated statements
made by the seller prior to the written agreement.24 The dual basis of
the Investors decision makes it difficult to discern if the court was
actually allowing the disclaimer of an express warranty or simply
enforcing a merger clause.
Although the reasoning of Investors is unclear, other courts have
cited it for the proposition that express warranties can be
disclaimed. 126  For example, in APLications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co.,27 APLications Inc. was in the business of adapting and reselling
computer systems to end-users (retail customers). 128 APLications Inc.
acquired a system based on assertions made in Hewlett-Packard's
written contract).
117. Investors, 389 F. Supp. at 41-42.
118. Id. at 42.
119. See id. at 44-45.
120. Id. (noting there was an "express written warranty under which plaintiff took
the equipment from defendant.").
121. Id. at 46 (discussing how the breach of warranty claim must fail).
122. E. Allan Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.3, at 223 (2d ed. 1998)
(noting that a merger clause (also known as an integration clause) "'merges' prior
negotiations into the writing. A typical clause includes a recital that the writing
'contains the entire agreement of the parties."').
123. Id. at 215 ("The parol evidence rule is best understood in light of its purpose:
to give legal effect to whatever intention the parties may have had to make their
writing at least a final and perhaps also a complete expression of their agreement.").
Thus, if the parol evidence rule is applicable the court may disregard any agreements
made prior to the contract that are not contained within that document. See id.
124. Investors, 389 F. Supp. at 44 ("That plaintiff cannot have recourse to supposed
representations or warranties ... is elemental; the terms of such a contract cannot be
varied by parole evidence.").
125. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 488-89 (explaining the difficulty in
concluding the court allowed the disclaimer).
126. See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1298 (5th Cir.
1980); Jaskey Fin. and Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 163 (E.D.
Penn. 1983); APLications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 UCC Rep. Serv.
1293, 1295 (Super. Ct. Mass. 1977).
127. 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
128. Id. at 131.
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brochures. 19 Upon installing the system, APLications discovered that
the computer was inadequate for its needs.'Y Subsequently,
APLications brought an action against Hewlett-Packard based on a
breach of warranty claim.3 1  The court held that the disclaimer of
warranties in the contract effectively negated any express
warranties. 132  In doing so, the court treated the disclaimability of
implied and express warranties the same in the computer transaction
context.133  Similarly, the court in Westfield Chemical Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp.,"3 held that a contractual waiver of implied and
express warranties was valid.135 The court based its decision on
statutory requirements of conspicuousness.' Both the APLications
Inc. court and the Westfield court cited to Investors Premium to justify
their decisions. 37
A small minority of courts have followed the general disclaimer
rule13 by holding that express warranties in computer information
transactions are undisclaimable.139 For example, in Consolidated Data
Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.," the buyer sued on a
breach of express warranty claim based on written specifications and
promotional literature it had received from the seller. 4 ' The seller
argued that parol descriptions did not survive the disclaimer in the
final contract.1 42 The court instead found the disclaimer to be invalid,
despite the contract's disclaimer and integration clauses, 43 and it
129. Id. ("Responding to H-P's announcement and accompanying brochures
APLications contacted H-P about using APL/3000 .
130. Id.
131. Id. at 132.
132 Id. at 133 ("[P]laintiff contends that an express warranty was created by
defendant's descriptions of the computer. The agreement excludes this warranty as
well." (citation omitted)).
133. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 490 ("[S]atisfied that the disclaimer complied
with the Code requirement for disclaiming implied warranties, the court determined
that the '[a]greement excludes this [express] warranty as well [as any implied
warranty]."' (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
134. 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1293 (Super. Ct. Mass. 1977).
135. Id. at 1295 ("I also find that the disclaimer is valid and effective so as to
disclaim all warranties express or implied pursuant to GLc 106, § 2-316 ....").
136. Id. The UCC requires that disclaimers of warranties be in conspicuous
language. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2000).
137. APLications, 501 F. Supp. at 133-34; Westfield, 21 UCC Rep. Serv., at 1295.
APLications and Westfield also cited to Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 541
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). APLications, 501 F. Sup. at 133-34; Westfield, 21 UCC Rep.
Serv. at 1295.
138. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (explaining that the general
rule is that express warranties cannot be disclaimed).
139. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 496-97 (noting that the rejection of
disclaimers against express warranties in computer cases is a minority position).
140. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 388-89.
142. Id. at 391.
143. Id. at 391-93. The court in Consolidated reached the opposite conclusion of
the court in Investors on similar facts (in both cases the seller's defense was based on
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reasoned that the disclaimer could not "be permitted to override the
highly particularized warranty created by the specifications ....
[T]hus we conclude that the express statements.., prevail over the
general warranty disclaimer."'" Similarly, in L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v.
AT & T Information Systems, Inc.,145 the court held that a contractual
disclaimer combined with an integration clause does not automatically
invalidate prior oral and written warranties in computer
transactions.146  Even though the court did not make a final
determination on the issue,147 it did conclude that a merger clause was
not necessarily determinative of the parties' final intent.'48
Furthermore, the court noted that the seller relied upon the disclaimer
provision in the contract and cited to UCC section 2-316 in holding
that "a warranty disclaimer inconsistent with an express warranty is
inoperative.' 149
The reasons for this discrepancy in the handling of computer cases
versus unrelated cases are unclear. A common thread running
through these cases, however, is their treatment of the parol evidence
rule. 50 In several of the cases previously discussed, the warranties
relied upon by the plaintiffs were either made orally or based on
advertisements. 5' According to UCC section 2-316(1), parol evidence
of a warranty can be set aside by "a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement.' 152 Computer transactions are
often conducted using standard form contracts that include by default
disclaimer and integration clauses.'53 Therefore, the effect of such
arrangements in jurisdictions following the majority rule in computer
transactions is that a buyer who has relied on parol representations
made by the seller prior to the contract is precluded from asserting a
warranty defense.
a broad disclaimer clause and a merger clause). See id at 391-92.
144. Id.
145. 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 570 ("We... find that AT & T's statement... may amount to an
express warranty.").
147. Id. at 571. The court was deciding an appeal of a summary judgment motion
and held that "on the breach of express warranty claim, we believe that the district
court's decision ... must be reversed and remanded." Id.
148. Id. at 569 (noting that the mere presence of a merger clause was not in and of
itself evidence of a complete agreement) (citing Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. Inc. v.
Burroughs Corp., 890 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1989)).
149. Id. at 570.
150. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 493-96 (discussing the importance of the
parol or extrinsic evidence rule).
151. See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text.
152. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2000) (referring to UCC section 2-202).
153. Chretien-Dar, supra note 104, at 495 (discussing the effect of "standard
contract clauses that combine merger clauses and disclaimers into one section").
154. Id. at 496 (explaining the effect of the parol evidence rule and merger clauses).
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The seller's immunity under the parol evidence rule is limited by
two factors. 55 First, parol evidence contradicts a written agreement if
the court determines that the writing is not intended as the final
expression of the parties' agreement.5 6 Second, even if the writing
was intended as the final agreement, parol evidence may still be
introduced if the writing is not completely integrated.'"
2. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Of the remaining two warranties provided by the UCC, the implied
warranty of merchantability, described in section 2-314 of the UCC, is
most important. Because the implied warranty of merchantability has
the potential to apply to all transactions, regardless of any statements
made by the seller,"5 its scope is potentially much broader than both
the express warranty159 or implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose."6  Unlike the express warranty, the implied warranty of
merchantability attaches itself to a contract by "force of law",' and
does not require the parties to make any specific statements. 62
Rather, it reflects assumptions based on the nature of the transaction
itself.163
To succeed on a claim for breach of warranty under section 2-314,
the buyer must prove that the seller is a merchant and that there was a
contract for the sale of goods."6 Normally, these requirements will
not be difficult to meet.65 The true hurdle imposed by section 2-314 is
proving that the seller's product deviated from the standard of
merchantability."6 The UCC provides a list of factors to aid in the
155. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-4, at 627-28.
156. Id at 627.
157. Id. at 627-28; 2 Farnsworth, supra note 122, § 7.3, at 216 (explaining the
significance of a completely integrated document: "If the agreement is only partially
integrated, however, evidence of prior agreements or negotiations is admissible to
supplement the writing though not to contradict it. If the agreement is completely
integrated, not even evidence of 'a consistent additional term' is admissible to explain
the writing.").
158. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2000). Section 2-314 provides in relevant part: "(I) Unless
excluded or modified (under Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind."
159. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
161. Joel R. Wolfson, Express Warranties and Published Information Content
Under Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, in PLI Course Handbook, The UCITA
Revolution: The New E-Commerce Model for Software and Database Licensing
(2000), available at WL 600 PLI/Pat 317, 328 [hereinafter The UCITA Revolution].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-7, at 510-11.
165. Id. at 511-13 ("In the normal case, proving the existence of a 'contract for sale'
will pose no problem .... Only rarely will one have occasion to wonder whether a
potential defendant is a 'merchant."').
166. Id. at 510-11 (noting what the plaintiff in a merchantability action must prove).
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definition of merchantability, stating that "[g]oods to be merchantable
must be at least such as: pass without objection in the trades under
the contract description; and in the case of fungible goods, are of fair
average quality within the description; and are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used."167
These criteria illustrate that merchantability is based in large part
on whether the product compares favorably to other brands in the
marketplace. 168 The majority of section 2-314 litigation centers on the
"fit for ordinary purposes" standard found in subsection 2(C). 169 This
concept is best illustrated by the following examples. "A pressure
gauge which did not measure pressure building up in an expansion
joint"'7° or "[a] haystacking machine which caught fire on the first day
the buyer used it"'' were held "to be unfit for ordinary purposes and
unmerchantable.' 17 2 A furniture set with minor defects, however, was
not deemed unfit. 73 The furniture set is considered fit for ordinary
purposes because the merchantability standard does not require the
product to be perfect.174
Another standard that has found wide judicial acceptance in
implied warranty cases is that the goods must "pass without objection
in the trade.' ' 7  This requirement is similar to the "fit for ordinary
purposes" inquiry but focuses more on trade usages.176  The
determinative issue under this standard is whether the product in
question can be sold without drawing complaints that similar brands
would not receive. 77 Cases based on this standard often compare
several brands to determine what are acceptable practices. 78
Just as in express warranty cases,7 9 the courts have had difficulty
applying the UCC's implied warranty of merchantability to computer
transactions.80 Software publishers routinely disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability. 8' Additionally, courts have been
167. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(c) (2000).
168. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-8, at 519.
169. Id. at 521.
170. Id. at 522 (citing Bernard v. Dresser Indus., 691 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. 1985)).
171. Id. (citing Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., 340 N.W.2d 369 (Neb. 1983)).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Pronti v. DML, 103 A.D.2d 916 (1984)).
174. Id. at 522-23.
175. Id. at 523 ("[Cases litigated under the pass-without-objection requirement
demonstrate its wide applicability.").
176. Id.
177. See id. at 523-24 (illustrating the point through examples in various cases).
178. See id.
179. See supra notes 104-57 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in
applying the express warranty to computer information transactions).
180. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
181. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in
Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J.
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 393, 393 (1997) ("Software publishers disclaim the
implied warranty of merchantability because they do not know what they might be
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relatively hesitant to construe the warranty in software transactionsy 2
For example, in In re Franklin Computer Corp., - the court refused to
enforce the implied warranty of merchantability where a DOS-based
computer represented as being Apple-compatible failed to perform
accordingly."" The plaintiff, Wolsten, alleged that the implied
warranty of merchantability was breached when the computer failed
to run Apple software.'1 The court noted that there were thousands
of Apple programs that could potentially run on the computer and
that Wolsten could not offer proof of incompatibility beyond the
programs he himself had run. 86
Although few courts have discussed the application of the UCC's
implied warranty provisions in computer transactions, many
commentators argue that the implied warranty should not be utilized
in that context. With respect to computer software contracts, critics
have attacked the application of the implied warranty of
merchantability as being out of step with emerging technology." The
arguments against applying the warranty can be distilled into four
main sets. First, one critic asserts that software falls outside the scope
of the UCC.lm As previously mentionedy the UCC applies only to
transactions in goods.90  Although most courts have held that
software is a good 9' some critics claim the UCC was never intended
to apply to intangibles. They argue that "[i]ntangibles are
fundamentally different from traditional goods,"'93 and also note that
the Article 2 definition of goods specifically refers to movable
promising if they give it."); see also infra notes 187-221 and accompanying text
(discussing why the implied warranty of merchantability should not be applied to
computer information contracts).
182. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 181, at 397-98 (explaining how the similarity
between software transactions and services has hindered the application of the
warranty).
183. 57 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
184. Id. at 157-58.
185. Id. at 157.
186. Id. at 157-58.
187. Edward G. Durney, The Warranty of Merdantability and Computer Software
Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 511, 521 (1984)
("The warranty of merchantability cannot usefully be applied by analogy to computer
software transactions ...."); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 181, at 399 ("Such a warranty
logically cannot apply to new inventions still in the experimental stage, or custom-
made or unique products. Software frequently qualifies for all of these adjectives.");
Jeffrey C. Selman & Christopher S. Chen, Steering the Titanic Clear of the Iceberg:
Saving the Sale of Software front the Perils of Warranties, 31 U.S.F. L Rev. 531, 560
(1997) ("The implied warranty of merchantability is meaningless when applied to
computer software.").
188. Durney, supra note 187, at 514 ("A warranty of merchantability should not be
applied directly in software transactions ... because software is an intangible.").
189. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
190. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000).
191. See supra note 50.
192- See e.g., Durney, supra note 187, at 515-16.
193. Id. at 515.
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objects.194 They reason that movability is a characteristic of physical
objects, and therefore refers only to tangibles.'95  Software is,
technically speaking, an intangible that can neither be moved nor
handled, 96 and thus movability has no meaning for software.' 7
The second argument against applying the warranty of
merchantability in software cases rests on a reading of the UCC
definition of the "sale" of goods. 9s Section 2-106 defines sale as "the
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."'199 Software
programs, however, are usually licensed and not sold to the
purchaser °.2 °  A license, unlike a sale of title, grants limited
nonexclusive rights to the purchaser. 0 ' In licensing arrangements the
buyer cannot make copies of the software for sale or distribution. 2
Critics therefore argue that because a license is a more restricted form
of transfer than the passing of title, it does not meet the definition of a
sale under section 2-106.203
Third, other critics contend that the warranty of merchantability
cannot meaningfully be applied to software20° because the measures of
merchantability described above rely on comparisons between similar
goods. 25 Software, however, is unlike other goods.2° For example, it
is difficult to determine what a software program's "ordinary
purposes" are2' 7 because there are many different types of computer
programs, and therefore an ordinary purpose does not exist for
software as a whole.20 8  These critics further contend that it is
meaningless to draw categorical distinctions between programs
because qualitative comparisons are difficult to make.20 9 Essentially,
they argue that computer programs are a collection of ideas that
cannot effectively be compared to one another.21 0 In this respect,
194. Id. at 515-17; U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000).
195. Durney, supra note 187, at 517 ("Movability is a physical, spatial quality.
Consequently, it only makes sense in reference to tangibles, which have physical
qualities.").
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2000) ("[A] warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale . ..
199. See id. § 2-106(1) (2000).
200. Durney, supra note 187, at 518; Zammit, supra note 37, at 112 (noting that
most software is licensed).
201. Durney, supra note 187, at 518-19 (describing the differences between a
transfer of title and a license).
202. Id. at 518.
203. Id. at 519-20.
204. Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 560.
205. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
206. See Durney, supra note 187, at 522.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 522-23 (noting the diversity of software programs).
209. Id. at 523; Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 561.
210. Durney, supra note 187, at 523; Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 561.
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software programs are akin to services.211 A service, unlike a good, is
unique and not resalable2 1  and this uniqueness makes qualitative
comparisons inappropriate.1 3 Without the ability to compare, it is
impossible to determine what would "pass without objection in the
trade" or what the "ordinary purposes" for a service are.2 14 Thus,
these critics contend that the implied warranty of merchantability is
inapplicable to software contracts. 15
The fourth and final argument that critics make against applying the
UCC's implied warranty of merchantability to computer transactions
is that it stifles innovation in the industry.1 6 This argument stems
from the idea that there is no meaningful standard of merchantability
with respect to software.217 With no such standard in place the
enforcement of the warranty would be arbitrary.1 s Industry analysts
fear that courts will tend to err on the side of the consumer, -21 9 which
would force software publishers to make their product "virtually
perfect." In turn this would create enormous liability for producers,
and thus force them to curtail development of new products. -221
The preceding discussionmn points out that there are numerous
conceptual difficulties in applying the implied warranty of
merchantability to computer information transactions. The implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, however, presents fewer
difficulties.
3. The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
The third and final warranty this Note will discuss concerning
computer information transactions is the UCC implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. This type of warranty is narrower in
scope and has more requirements than the warranty of
merchantability.3 Even if a good meets the merchantability
211. Durney, supra note 187, at 523.
212 Id-
213. Id.
214. Id. at 523 n.54 (quoting Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 264 N.E.2d 664
(Mass. 1971)).
215. Id. at 523.
216. Id. at 524 ("Imposing a warranty of merchantability upon software producers
discourages innovation and development in the software industry .... [Clourts will
tend to allow recovery for any damages .... caused by any defect. The standard of
merchantability will thereby become one of virtual perfection .... ").
217. Id.; see also supra notes 204-15 and accompanying text (discussing why the
implied warranty of merchantability cannot be applied to software).
21& See Durney, supra note 187, at 524.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 524-25.
222- See supra notes 181-221 and accompanying text.
223. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-10, at 527-28 ("Sections 2-314 and 2-315
make plain that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower, more
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requirement, there is no guarantee that it will meet the requirements
of the fitness warranty. 4
For the buyer to establish a claim for breach of the fitness warranty,
the seller must have reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose,
offer advice on those goods, and the buyer must rely upon that
advice.' z  To prove the seller had reason to know of the buyer's
purpose, the circumstances must indicate that the seller was put on
notice?126 In the majority of cases this is accomplished when the buyer
relays his purpose and particular needs to the seller. 7 Furthermore,
the "relative state of the knowledge of the two parties" is used to
determine if there has been reliance in a particular case.218
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose most often
applies to business-to-business transactions?229 Typically, this warranty
arises when a business buys specific goods that must be specially
manufactured or assembled.20 For example, in Hollingsworth v. The
Software House Inc., 1 Hollingsworth, the buyer, was a small
manufacturer of electrical parts12 that purchased a software program
to manage its inventory. 3  Hollingsworth wanted to purchase a
program that would facilitate a "single-entry system."'  It purchased
the system from The Software House based upon assurances that the
system could perform single-entry inventory?35 After purchasing the
program, Hollingsworth discovered that the software lacked this
capability. 6 Hollingsworth subsequently sued and claimed a breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.?37 The
specific, and more precise.").
224. Id. § 9-10, at 528.
225. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2000) states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
226. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-10, at 529.
227. Id.
228. Id. § 9-10, at 530-31 (noting that where the buyer is more knowledgeable than
the seller, the seller may be able to prove a lack of reliance).
229. Id. § 9-10, at 529; cf Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 546-47 ("[C]onsumers
rarely require that a software product perform anything other than its ordinary
purpose. As a result, consumer litigation under the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose is sparse.").
230. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-10, at 529 (noting that the "most
common circumstance" in which the warranty applies involves a business buying
specially manufactured goods); see Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 546.
231. 513 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
232. Id. at 1373.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1374 (stating that the defendant's employee "testified that he initially
believed that the system.., would perform the single-entry inventory function").
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1375.
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court upheld Hollingsworth's claim and found that a fitness warranty
had been made and subsequently violated.2-
Although critics have attacked the application of the warranty of
merchantability to software transactions,'2-9 these same critics support
the application of the fitness warranty.2" These critics approve of this
warranty in the software context because the seller controls the terms
of any given fitness warranty. 41 For example, a computer program
governed by the warranty of merchantability is automatically subject
to a requirement that it is "fit for ... ordinary purposes.2 41 2 A fitness
warranty, however, will not be implied except when the seller knows
or should know of the buyer's expectations.243 In this respect, the
fitness warranty is similar to the express warranty."
A discussion of the UCC's warranty structure is not complete
without an examination of its disclaimer provisions. These provisions
control the method for repudiating any of the aforementioned
warranties. The following section vill discuss the various
requirements for the disclaimer of the implied warranties and the
difficulty courts have in applying those provisions to computer
transactions.
4. Disclaimers Of Implied Warranties
UCC section 2-316(2)-(3) governs the disclaimer of implied
warranties.245  A cursory examination of 2-316(2) leads to the
conclusion that disclaimer provisions do not require very specific
language to be enforceable. 24 There is, however, more here than
238. Id at 1377 ("Competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial
court's finding that there was an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose....").
239. See supra notes 187-221 and accompanying text.
240. See Selman & Chen, supra note 187, at 546-47 (noting positive attributes of
fitness warranty); see also Durney, supra note 187, at 530 (same).
241. See Durney, supra note 187, at 530.
242. See supra notes 204-15 and accompanying text; see also U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)
(2000) (stating the "fit for ordinary purposes" standard).
243. Durney, supra note 187, at 530 ("[T]he warranty would not be implied except
when the seller knows that the buyer expects software of a certain quality."). Thus,
the seller is more likely to be aware of any potential warranty claims against him.
244. Id. (noting that the "underlying policy [of the fitness warranty] is similar to
that of [the] express warranty").
245. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) provides that:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
246. See id
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meets the eye.247 Subsection (2) states that the disclaimer clause must
mention merchantability.2 4 In fact, the majority of disclaimers do
mention merchantability, and therefore some courts require the term
to be present.249 Subsection (3), however, states that a disclaimer need
not mention merchantability and language such as "'as is' [or] 'with all
faults"' will suffice." Ambiguities aside, most drafters heed
suggestions to include the word merchantability in disclaimer
provisions. 1 The following is an example of a typical disclaimer
clause: "EXCLUSIONS OF WARRANTIES, NO WARRANTIES.
The implied warranties of MERCHANTABILITY and fitness for a
particular purpose and all other warranties, express or implied, are
EXCLUDED from this transaction and shall not apply to the goods
sold." 2
Importantly, section 2-316 requires that the disclaimer be
conspicuous.3 The meaning of the term "conspicuous" has been the
subject of extensive litigation.' The UCC provides a definition of the
term in section 1-201(10),"5 which states that "the test is whether
attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it." 6  Courts
have identified several requirements necessary to constitute
conspicuousness, 7 such as "capitalization, typeface, and color
methods" which are cited as examples in UCC section 1-201(10)."
Additionally, courts have ruled that the location of the disclaimer
within the document is an important factor.2 9 It is also important to
247. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 632 ("It is comparatively easy to
draft a disclaimer that complies with 2-316(2); to draft a disclaimer that a court will
enforce is something else.").
248. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2000).
249. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 631.
250. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
251. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 631-32 (suggesting drafters include
warranty of merchantability).
252. Id. § 12-5, at 633.
253. See Bernard F. Kistler, Jr., Comment, U.C.C. Article Two Warranty
Disclaimers and the "Conspicuousness" Requirement of Section 2-316, 43 Mercer L.
Rev. 943, 944-45 (1992).
254. See generally White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 634-38 (noting that
several different interpretations of conspicuous have been advocated).
255. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2000) provides in relevant part:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING)
is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color.
256. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 10 (2000).
257. See generally White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 634-38 (discussing
the different interpretations courts have taken as to what constitutes
conspicuousness).
258. Id. at 634.
259. See Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 784 (E.D. Wis.
1982); see also White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 635-36 (discussing Massey-
Ferguson v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1969), where the court held a disclaimer to
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note that even though the purpose of disclaimer requirements is to put
the buyer on notice, many courts state that it is not necessary for the
buyer to have actual notice of the disclaimer.2 16
One area of computer disclaimer law that has received considerable
attention by courts and academics is the validity of "wrap" licenses.26'
Unlike disclaimers in regular contracts, the terms of a wrap-license are
generally presented post-sale. '  These agreements come in three
flavors: shrink-wrap, 3 click-wrap, -  and web-wrap.26 Courts are
increasingly scrutinizing wrap-licenses,2 6 and three cases particularly
stand out for their inconsistent decisions concerning the enforceability
of these agreements. ' 7
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology," the Third
Circuit held that shrink-wrap licenses were invalid based on the
application of UCC section 2-207.1 9 Section 2-207 governs whether
differing terms in an acceptance constitute enforceable terms in a
contract.'70 The court found that the clause in the shrink-wrap license
purporting to make the terms of the license binding was not part of
be invalid because the clause was located on the back of the document).
260. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 12-5, at 637-38 (noting that a "reasonable-
person standard" is employed to gauge the effectiveness of a disclaimer).
261. See David A. Einhorn, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Debate Continues, 38
IDEA 383, 383-84 (1998) (discussing the practice of using shrink-wrap licenses);
Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping") of American
Copyright Law, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 173, 173-75 (1999); Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just
Click Here: Article 2B's Failure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in
Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. .J. 907, 907-14 (1998)
(discussing click-wrap licenses).
262. See Einhorn, supra note 261, at 383.
263. Margaret Jane Radin, Human, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind.
LJ. 1125, 1134 (2000).
There are two different species of shrink-wrap license. In the first kind, the
terms are presented before purchase of the software, on the box or plastic
shrink-wrap that covers the box. [Breaking]... the shrink-wrap... signifies
that you have agreed to the terms and a license contract is formed. In the
second kind of shrink-wrap license, the terms are not presented... before
you buy; instead, the outside of the box informs you that there are terms
inside that you will see later ....
Id.
264. Harrison, supra note 261, at 909 ("Click-wrap contracting involves the text of
an offer for computer software, presented on a computer screen along with the license
terms. A computer user manifests his acceptance of the offer by clicking an on-screen
box ....").
265. J.T. Westermeier, Web Agreements, in PLI Course Handbook, Representing
the New Media Company (1998), available at 505 PLI/Pat 321, 326 ("The Web-wrap
agreements require the purchaser to accept the license terms before the information
products or other products are transferred.").
266. See Harrison, supra note 261, at 912-13.
267. See id. at 918-19.
268. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
269. Id at 103.
270. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000).
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the contract between the parties" It held that the defendant "did not
clearly express its unwillingness to proceed with the transactions
unless its additional terms were incorporated.""2 Similarly, the court
in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc. 23 on facts
similar to those in Step-Saver, found the shrink-wrap disclaimer to be
invalid.274 The Arizona Retail court held that a contract was formed
once the defendant agreed to ship goods to the plaintiff,275 and its
terms could not be varied by a license agreement that appeared after
shipping. 76
Unlike the Step-Saver and Arizona Retail courts, the Seventh
Circuit held that shrink-wrap licenses were enforceable in ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg 7  Judge Easterbrook found that "unless their terms
are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general" these
licenses were valid2 8 To buttress its decision, the court pointed to
other types of transactions where terms are delivered post-sale27 9 and
found no reason why software should be treated differently 80 The
court decided that it was reasonable to enforce shrink-wrap licenses as
long as the consumer had notice and an opportunity to get a refund.'
Currently there is no judicial or scholarly consensus on the issue of
wrap-license enforceability. The decisions in Step Saver and ProCD
illustrate the two general approaches. Whether a wrap-license will be
enforced depends upon a court's view as to when the contract was
formed." If the court treats the wrap-license as a "new or additional
term[]" it will most likely not enforce the license." 3 If, however, the
court views the sale "as conditioned on assent" to the wrap-license,
the disclaimer will likely be enforced!"4
A survey of the enforceability of disclaimers and the validity of
warranties in computer transactions cannot be limited to a discussion
of the UCC."s  For example, various consumer statutes can also
influence the effectiveness of a contractual disclaimer 86 These
271. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d at 103.
272. Id.
273. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
274. Id. at 764 ("This court reaches the same result as the Step-Saver court .
275. Id. at 765.
276. Id.
277. 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1451 (analogizing the impracticability of placing the entire license on the
box top to airline tickets and warranties in sales of goods).
280. Id. at 1451-52.
281. Id. at 1452-53 (discussing U.C.C. § 2-204 and 2-206).
282. Harrison, supra note 261, at 926-27.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 927.
285. See Zammit, supra note 37, at 103-104 (discussing the variety of statutes that
can apply to retail computer transactions).
286. Id.
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statutes are found on both the federal and state level, "  and their
primary purpose is to provide standards to govern the "form and
content of consumer warranties."'  The federal consumer protection
legislation is known as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Warranty
Act" or "Act").'
C. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Congress passed the Warranty Act in 1975 "to improve the
adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception,
and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products."-"
The responsibility for the creation of interpretive legislation and the
enforcement of the Warranty Act lies with the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC").291  The Warranty Act governs all written
consumer product warranties 92 A consumer product is defined as
"tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes. "293 Additionally, the federal regulations promulgating the
Act state that if it is unclear whether a product meets the above
definition "any ambiguity will be resolved in favor of coverage."''
The Warranty Act does not require a seller to provide a written
warranty.295 Furthermore, the Act is inapplicable if the seller chooses
to give an oral warranty.29 A seller who gives a written warranty,
however, must comply with the provisions of the Warranty Act.'
The Warranty Act generally requires warrantors or sellers to meet
three basic requirements. 298 First, the warrantor must designate the
warranty as either "full" or "limited."2' In order to be classified as
287. Robert T. Daunt, Warranties and Mass Distributed Software, I Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 255,279 (1985).
288. Id. A discussion of each state's consumer statutes is beyond the scope of this
Note.
289. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1994).
290. Id. § 2302(a).
291. Daunt, supra note 287, at 279-80.
292. Zammit, supra note 37, at 151.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1994).
294. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (2000).
295. Understanding the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, at
http:l/www.ftc.govfbcp/conline/pubsfbuspubslvarranty/undermag.htm (last visited on
Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Understanding] (noting that the Act does not require
businesses to provide written warranties).
296. Id (explaining that "the Act does not apply to oral warranties. Only written
warranties are covered").
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1994) provides:
Any warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written
warranty shall clearly and conspicuously designate such warranty in the
following manner, unless exempted from doing so by the Commission... :
(1) If the written warranty meets the Federal minimum standards for
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"full," the seller's warranty must satisfy section 2304 of the Warranty
Act,3" which states that if the warranty does not meet the statutory
requirement then it must be designated a "limited" warranty. 0' This
bifurcation presumably allows buyers to better distinguish between
warranties. 3°2 Because of the broad liability attached to full
warranties, most vendors will likely favor limited warranties.
Second, section 2304 of the Warranty Act sets minimum standards
for consumer product warranties.3 " Subsection (a)(1) provides that
the warrantor must remedy a defective product within a reasonable
amount of time and do it free of charge .30  This requirement is not
problematic for software vendors because it is usually the "minimum
defensible standard... to use in designing a warranty policy."30 6
Section 2304(a)(2) limits the vendor's ability to restrict the duration of
the UCC's implied warranties, °7 while section 2304(a)(3) and (a)(4)
prohibit the warrantor from excluding consequential damages38
warranty set forth in section 2304 of this title, then it shall be
conspicuously designated a "full (statement of duration) warranty."
(2) If the written warranty does not meet the Federal minimum
standards for warranty... then it shall be conspicuously designated a
"limited warranty."
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-15, at 547 ("Apparently the
Congress believed that consumers' perceptions of the substance of written warranties
would be sharpened by forcing all sellers to fit within one of the two categories.").
303. Daunt, supra note 287, at 280-81 (noting that "software vendor[s] would [not]
want to give a full warranty because of the various damage and remedy
considerations .... [M]ost software warranties intended for consumers should be
clearly titled 'limited warranty."').
304. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1994) provides:
In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a
written warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty-
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such consumer product
within a reasonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect,
malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor may not
impose any limitation on the duration of any implied warranty on the
product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for
breach of any written or implied warranty on such product, unless such
exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the
warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or
malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to
remedy defects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must
permit the consumer to elect either a refund for, or replacement
without charge of, such product or part (as the case may be).
305. Id.
306. Daunt, supra note 287, at 283.
307. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2)-(3).
308. 3 Farnsworth, supra note 122, § 12.9, at 204-06 (defining consequential
damages as "loss other than loss in vahte, and the party is also entitled to recovery for
this .... Consequential damages include such items as injury to person or property
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unless such waivers or disclaimers are conspicuous and grant the
consumer a refund if a product cannot be repaired.'
Third, section 2308 of the Warranty Act voids any disclaimer of the
implied warranty of merchantability or warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.310 Obviously, this is contrary to UCC § 2-316's
relatively liberal allowance of implied warranty disclaimers."' The
Warranty Act does, however, allow the vendor to limit the duration of
the implied warranties to a "reasonable" time, with the caveat that the
limitation must be "conscionable. 312
Significantly, no cases squarely address whether the Magnuson-
Moss Act covers software transactions. 3 3 The few software cases that
involve a claim under the Warranty Act simply assume the Act's
applicability without discussion.314 For example, in Microsoft Corp. v.
Manning,315 Manning brought a claim under the Warranty Act for
breach of express and implied warranties.1 6 Microsoft had released a
version of its DOS operating software that contained a disk-
caused by the breach." (emphasis in original)).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4).
310. Id § 2308 provides:
(a)Restrictions on disclaimers or modifications
No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section) any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such
consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the
consumer with respect to such consumer [piroduct, or (2) at the time of sale,
or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier enters into a service contract with
the consumer which applies to such consumer product.
(b) Limitation on duration
For purposes of this chapter (other than section 2304(a)(2) of this title),
implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written
warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set
forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the
face of the warranty.
(c) Effectiveness of disclaimers, modifications, or limitations
A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in violation of this section
shall be ineffective for purposes of this chapter and State law.
311. See Daunt, supra note 287, at 285; see also supra notes 245-60 and
accompanying text (discussing the various ways implied warranties can be disclaimed
under the UCC).
312. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b).
313. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 ("There are no published court rulings that have
settled the question of the applicability of the Magnuson-Moss Act to software .. .
Zammit, supra note 37, at 155 (stating that "[n]o cases exist on the issue").
314. See, eg., Stuessy v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(noting the case was dismissed for jurisdictional purposes but that no question of
Magnuson-Moss Act's applicability was raised).
315. 914 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App. 1995).
316. Id at 605.
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compression utility317 called DoubleSpace.31s After the product's
release, customers complained it was faulty and had caused their
machines to lose data.319 Manning brought suit alleging that the
deficiencies in the program violated the Warranty Act.320 Microsoft
had provided a limited warranty321 with the software and disclaimed
all other warranties in its license agreement.322 Nonetheless, the court
applied the disclaimed implied warranties, 323 presumably based on the
Warranty Act's prohibition of disclaimers of implied warranties.324
Although courts have not explicitly stated that the Warranty Act
applies to computer transactions, most commentators have stated that
software comes within the scope of the Warranty Act in the consumer
context.321 They reason that software sold in a retail environment is a
consumer product because it "is directed for distribution to the class
of people the Act is designed to protect. 32 6
Although the Warranty Act apparently applies to ordinary
consumer computer transactions, it remains questionable whether the
Act protects small businesses as well. Section 2301 of the Act defines
consumer products as those sold for "personal, family, or household
purposes. '327 The Federal Trade Commission's rules interpreting the
statute, however, cast a much wider net,328 for they clearly note that
"the use to which a product is put ... is not determinative" of whether
it is a consumer product.3 9 Rather, the use of that type of product
controls whether it is within the scope of the Warranty Act. Thus,
word-processing software would be considered a consumer product
317. Id. ("[D]isk compression software ... compresses the data on a hard disk,
thereby increasing a computer's storage capacity .....
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 606.
321. Id. at 609.
322. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 & n.60-61.
323. See Manning, 914 S.W.2d at 609-10 (explaining that the court held for the
plaintiffs).
324. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 ("Apparently, the court accepted the applicability
of the Magnuson-Moss claim because, despite Microsoft's disclaimer, the Manning
court applied the disclaimed warranty .... ).
325. Daunt, supra note 287, at 292-93 (arguing that ambiguity should favor
inclusion within the Act); Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 (noting that courts would rule
software falls under the Act); Zammit, supra note 37, at 155 ("Most commentators
take the position that at least some types of software would be considered consumer
products under the Act.").
326. Zammit, supra note 37, at 155.
327. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1994).
328. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (2000) provides in relevant part:
[t]his means that a product is a 'consumer product' if the use of that type of
product is not uncommon. The percentage of sales or the use to which a
product is put by any individual buyer is not determinative.
329. Id.
330. Id.; see, e.g., Balser v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 512 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (holding that a $3 million private jet was not a product "normally used" for
personal, family, or household purposes).
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within the province of the Warranty Act whether it is used at home or
in the office, but custom designed software for a commercial entity
would not be a consumer product even if it is used by consumers in
their own homes.331
A party will encounter various inconsistencies when bringing a
UCC warranty claim involving a computer information transaction.
For example, depending on the jurisdiction, software may not be
considered a good for the purposes of UCC coverage,3-  the disclaimer
of express warranties may or may not be enforceable, 33 and the
implied warranty of merchantability may or may not be applicable to
computer information transactions. 33 The uniform codes are
supposed to prevent exactly this kind of ambiguity in the law. The
UCC, however, was not drafted to cover the computer information
transactions of our modem economy.335 The current disarray in this
area of the law necessitates uniform legislation drafted specifically to
deal with computer information transactions. UCITA has presented
itself as the "statute for the job." Part II of this Note will evaluate the
efficacy of that statement.
II. THE UCITA CONTROVERSY
As Part I outlined,336 warranty law for retail transactions in
computer information is currently in a confused state. The passage of
UCITA will provide a uniform set of laws governing computer
information transactions. This part will discuss those changes and
their potential impact. Part II provides a brief overview of UCITA's
warranty provisions and summarizes the arguments both for and
against passage of the statute.
A. The UCITA Statute
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act was
designed to bring uniformity to the world of computer information
transactions.337  Its drafters sought to remove the uncertainty
regarding whether and to what extent Article 2 of the UCC, common
law principles, and the Warranty Act should apply to computer
information transactions.33 Thus, UCITA would, ideally, do for
331. Daunt, supra note 287, at 292.
332. See supra Part I.A.
333. See supra notes 108-57 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
335. U.C.I.T.A., Prefatory Note (2000 Draft).
336. See supra Part I.
337. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing the uncertainty in the current
law).
338. U.C.I.T.A. Prefatory note; Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 5.
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computer information transactions what the UCC did for the sale of
goods.339
In July 1999, the NCCUSL approved UCITA for adoption by the
states. It is now up to the individual state legislatures to consider the
proposed statute and decide whether and in what form it should be
passed. 4° Currently, UCITA has been signed into law in both
Maryland and Virginia." It has also been introduced for
consideration in the state legislatures of Arizona and New Jersey.-"
The scope of UCITA is confined to transactions in computer
information.343 This includes all transactions where "the subject
matter includes information that is in, or is to be provided or created
in, a form directly capable of being processed in or received from a
computer."3" UCITA, therefore, does not apply to sales of goods that
would normally be covered by the UCC.345 For example, the sale of a
car or television set would not fall within the statute's scope.3' 6 If,
however, a computer program were embedded within these goods and
the purpose of the transaction was to obtain the program, UCITA
would apply to the sale. 7 UCITA currently provides the following
warranties: Noninterference and Non-infringement, Express
Warranty, Implied Warranty of Merchantability of a Computer
Program, Implied Warranty of Informational Content, and the
Implied Warranty of Fitness for the Licensee's Purpose and System
Integration. 348
In most circumstances, express warranties under UCITA arise in
circumstances similar to those under the UCC.49  The proposed
339. U.C.I.T.A. Prefatory note.
340. NCCUSL - About Us, at http://www.nccusl.org/aboutus.htm (last visited
March 15, 2001). The NCCUSL can only propose model laws and uniform statutes to
the states. The final determination on whether to enact such laws remains with the
individual state legislatures. Id. Furthermore, the state legislatures need not adopt
the proposed statute "exactly as written;" they are free to modify it as they see fit. Id.
341. UCITA Online, What's Happening to UCITA in the States, at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/whathap.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2001).
342. Id.
343. U.C.I.T.A. Prefatory note.
344. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 6.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 401-405 (2000).
349. See U.C.I.T.A. § 402. Section 402 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Subject to subsection (c), an express warranty by a licensor is created as
follows:
(1) An affirmation of fact or promise made by the licensor to its
licensee, including by advertising, which relates to the information and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the information to be furnished under the agreement will conform
to the affirmation or promise.
(2) Any description of the information which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the information will
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UCITA rules governing models and demonstrations, however, differ
significantly from their UCC counterparts.'- The UCC rule simply
states, "[a]ny sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty. '351  Under UCITA, however,
several restrictions are placed on the creation of the warranty. For
example, UCITA uses a reasonable person standard and requires that
the model or demo be of a final product.31
UCITA also expressly addresses published informational content
within the context of express warranties. Published informational
content ("PIC") refers to material ordinarily intended to be used by a
human being.3 It is the "electronic equivalent of books, magazines,
art, and the like. ' 355 UCITA does not create any express warranties
with respect to PIC.35 6
The UCITA's Implied Warranty of Merchantability of a Computer
Program is somewhat analogous to the UCC's section 2-314 warranty
of merchantability.35 The UCITA section retains the "fit for ordinary
conform to the description.
(3) Any sample, model, or demonstration of a final product which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the performance of the information will reasonably conform to the
performance of the sample, model, or demonstration, taking into
account differences that would appear to a reasonable person in the
position of the licensee between the sample, model, or demonstration
and the information as it will be used.
Id.
350. Compare id. § 402(a)(3), with U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) (2000) (illustrating the
inclusion of new language within UCITA concerning the "basis of the bargain" test).
351. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).
352. See U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3) (2000); see also infra notes 389-95 and
accompanying text (discussing the effects of UCITA's changes to the express
warranty language).
353. See U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3).
354. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the relevance of "published
informational content" (emphasis omitted)).
355. 1&
356. Id. ("For express warranty law, under UCITA, express warranties are created
(or not) for informational content under the same standards as apply today.").
357. U.C.I.T.A. § 403, provides in relevant part:
(a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified, a licensor that is a
merchant with respect to computer programs of the kind warrants:
(1) to the end user that the computer program is fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such computer programs are used;
(2) to the distributor that:
(A) the program is adequately packaged and labeled as the
agreement requires; and
(B) in the case of multiple copies, the copies are within the
variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality, and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(3) that the program conforms to any promises or affirmations of fact
made on the container or label.
(b) Unless disclaimed or modified, other implied warranties with respect to
computer programs may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
(c) No warranty is created under this section with respect to informational
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purposes" test, but makes it specific to computer programs.""
Similarly, the UCITA requires that programs abide by any "promises
or affirmations" on their labels or containers.3 9 In contrast to the
UCC, however, UCITA does not require that computer programs
pass without objection in the trade.36° Finally, section 403 does not
create any warranties "with respect to informational content. '361
Unlike the UCC, section 404 of the UCITA provides an Implied
Warranty for Informational Content. 62 In contrast to PIC, this
material is not intended for "recipients generally, or to a class of
recipients, in substantially the same form. 36 3 Informational Content
is material intended to be used "by an individual in the ordinary use of
the information."3" Section 404 of UCITA protects informational
content from inaccuracies caused by the "merchant's failure to
perform with reasonable care. '365 A buyer cannot avail himself of this
protection, however, unless he has a "special relationship of reliance"
with the licensor.36
Another new warranty provided by UCITA is the Implied
Warranty of Fitness for the Licensee's Purpose and System
Integration.367 It provides that an implied warranty arises if the
content, but an implied warranty may arise under Section 404.
See also supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing section 2-314 of the
UCC).
358. U.C.I.T.A. § 403(a)(1); see also supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the "ordinary purposes" test under the UCC).
359. U.C.I.T.A. § 403(a)(3); U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (2000).
360. See U.C.I.T.A. § 403. For a discussion of the UCC requirements, see supra
notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
361. Id. § 403(c).
362. Section 404 provides in relevant part:
(a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified, a merchant that, in a
special relationship of reliance with a licensee, collects, compiles, processes,
provides, or transmits informational content warrants to that licensee that
there is no inaccuracy in the informational content caused by the merchant's
failure to perform with reasonable care.
(b) A warranty does not arise under subsection (a) with respect to:
(1) published informational content; or
(2) a person that acts as a conduit or provides no more than editorial
services in collecting, compiling, distributing, processing, providing, or
transmitting informational content that under the circumstances can be
identified as that of a third person.
Id. § 404.
363. Id. § 102(a)(52) ("Published Informational Content").
364. Id. § 102(a)(37) ("Informational Content").
365. Id. § 404(a).
366. Id. This language acts to limit the applicability of the Implied Warranty for
Informational Content. See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
367. U.C.I.T.A. § 405 provides in relevant part:
(a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified, if a licensor at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
computer information is required and that the licensee is relying on the
licensor's skill or judgment to select, develop, or furnish suitable
information, the following rules apply:
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"licensor at the time of contracting has reason to know" the licensee
has a particular purpose, and the "licensee is relying on the licensor's
skill.' 'a68 This warranty applies in two situations: (1) where the
licensee is seeking computer information for a particular purpose,19
and (2) where the licensee is seeking "a system consisting of computer
programs and goods. 370
Section 406 of UCITA governs warranty disclaimers and
modifications in computer information transactions.37 In general, the
UCITA's language is very similar to UCC section 2-316.-1 Indeed,
subsection 4 explicitly states that a disclaimer of an implied warranty
of merchantability sufficient under Article 2 of the UCC is sufficient
under UCTA.373
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), there is an implied
warranty that the information is fit for that purpose....
(c) If an agreement requires a licensor to provide or select a system
consisting of computer programs and goods, and the licensor has reason to
know that the licensee is relying on the skill or judgment of the licensor to
select the components of the system, there is an implied warranty that the
components provided or selected will function together as a system.
368. Id. § 405(a).
369. Id.
370. Id. § 405(c).
371. Id. § 406 provides in relevant part:
(a) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to disclaim or modify an express warranty must be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. Subject to
Section 301 with regard to parol or extrinsic evidence, the disclaimer or
modification is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable....
(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection:
(A) To disclaim or modify the implied warranty arising under Section 403,
language must mention "merchantability" or "quality" or use words of
similar import and, if in a record, must be conspicuous....
(2) Language to disclaim or modify the implied warranty arising under
Section 405 must be in a record and be conspicuous. It is sufficient to state
"There is no warranty that this information, our efforts, or the system will
fulfill any of your particular purposes or needs", or words of similar import.
(3) Language in a record is sufficient to disclaim all implied warranties if it
individually disclaims each implied warranty or, except for the warranty in
Section 401, if it is conspicuous and states "Except for express warranties
stated in this contract, if any, this 'information' 'computer program' is
provided with all faults, and the entire risk as to satisfactory quality,
performance, accuracy, and effort is with the user", or words of similar
import.
(4) A disclaimer or modification sufficient under [Article 2 or 2A of the
Uniform Commercial Code] to disclaim or modify an implied warranty of
merchantability is sufficient to disclaim or modify the warranties under
Sections 403 and 404. A disclaimer or modification sufficient under [Article
2 or 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code] to disclaim or modify an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is sufficient to disclaim or modify
the warranties under Section 405.
372. See id cmt. 4.a; see also supra notes 247-60 and accompanying text (discussing
U.C.C. section 2-316 in general).
373. U.C.I.T.A § 406(b)(4).
2503
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although section 208 of UCITA is not a warranty provision, it
controls how terms become part of a contract and therefore can affect
whether a warranty or disclaimer is valid.374 Paragraph 2 of section
208 essentially codifies the holding in Pro CD,375 by allowing for the
enforceability of post-sale licenses.376 Section 208 states that the
inclusion of the terms in a contract is determined by "manifesting
assent. '377 Section 112 defines manifesting assent as:
[A]ssent to a record or term if the person, acting with knowledge of,
or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a
copy of it: (1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt
or accept it; or (2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes
statements with reason to know that the other party or its electronic
agent may infer from the conduct or statement that the person
assents to the record or term s8
With respect to warranties, this would allow a seller to introduce
warranty and disclaimer language that the consumer could only view
after purchasing the product.379 Thus, a post-sale disclaimer would be
presumptively valid. 80
Many of UCITA's proposed changes to computer warranty law
have met strong resistance from members of the legal community.38" '
Opponents of UCITA allege that the statute favors software
publishers at the expense of consumers.382 The arguments against
adopting UCITA can be grouped into two basic categories: (1)
UCITA weakens existing warranty law by making it easier for
vendors to escape liability; and (2) UCITA makes the application of
warranty law needlessly confusing. The following section details the
views of UCITA's opponents.
374. § 208, provides in relevant part:
(1) A party adopts the terms of a record, including a standard form, as the
terms of the contract if the party agrees to the record, such as by manifesting
assent.
(2) The terms of a record may be adopted pursuant to paragraph (1) after
beginning performance or use if the parties had reason to know that their
agreement would be represented in whole or part by a later record to be
agreed on and there would not be an opportunity to review the record or a
copy of it before performance or use begins. If the parties fail to agree to the
later terms and did not intend to form a contract unless they so agreed,
Section 202(e) applies.
Id. § 208.
375. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ProCD
case, which held that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable.
376. U.C.I.T.A. § 208(2).
377. Id. § 208(1).
378. Id. § 112(a).
379. See id. § 208(2).
380. See id.
381. Rustad, supra note 15, at 560-61.
382. See id. at 555-56 (noting the dissatisfaction opponents have with mass market
licenses and UCITA's emphasis on private ordering).
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B. The Opponents' View
1. UCITA Weakens Existing Warranty Law
One of the proposed changes UCITA would make to warranty law
is to modify the requirements for the creation of an express warranty
by demonstration.383 The UCC made the creation of such a warranty
simpler because it was not subject to as many restrictions.' UCITA
provides that the product must "reasonably conform" to the
performance of the demonstration, -8- while the old rule under UCC
section 2-313 requires that the "goods shall conform."' The insertion
of the word "reasonably" acts to limit the application of the
warranty.3 7 Thus, UCITA's language lends itself to a more restrictive
application of the express warranty by demonstration. --'
UCITA also states that the creation of express warranties must take
into "account differences that would appear to a reasonable person in
the position of the licensee between the sample ... and the
information as it will be used."' This caveat further releases the
vendor from liability by allowing him to argue that the consumer
should have noticed any differences between the model and the actual
product.390
Furthermore, the language in section 402(a)(3) limits the
application of the warranty to "final" products.3 19 This suggests that
the vendor will be able to show preliminary or prototype versions of a
product, but avoid the creation of an express warranty.39" Thus, even
if the consumer believes he is viewing the actual product, no warranty
is formed.393 As long as the vendor is not intending to mislead the
consumer, there is no fraud.39
Section 402 of UCITA would also provide that no warranty is
created by "a display.., to illustrate the aesthetics, appeal, suitability
to taste, subjective quality, or the like of informational content."3,
Hypothetically, if a consumer makes a purchase based on the
appearance of the product on the store's computer or website and
383. See U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3).
384. See Kaner, supra note 16, at 28-29.
385. U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3).
386. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) (2000).
387. See Kaner, supra note 16, at 28.
388. See id. at 28-29.
389. U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3).
390. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 ("UCITA provides an additional defense for the
vendor to take to the jury, the 'differences' that should be noticed by a 'reasonable'
customer.").
391. U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3).
392. See Kaner, supra note 16, at 28.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. U.C.I.T.A. § 402(b)(2).
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receives a product that is "less appealing," he cannot make a warranty
claim.396 UCITA's exclusion of aesthetics is especially troublesome in
the computer graphics context.397 A licensee in this field would make
a purchase based on the appearance of the characters in a video game
or the look of a website 9 s The licensee's decisions, therefore, are
inescapably linked to the product's aesthetics.3 9 Under UCITA, a
licensee could be thwarted in these situations.4 °
UCITA's critics note that this discussion is not merely academic.401
Due to the complexity of software, the performance of
models/samples is often a decisive factor in a consumer's decision
about whether to make a purchase.41 These consumers will expect
vendors to honor the representations made in product
demonstrations.40 3 Furthermore, evidence suggests that a vendor's
reliance on legal arguments, such as the distinction between final and
prototype or what a reasonable person should have assumed, will do
little to vindicate aggrieved licensees.
UCITA's disclaimer provisions have also been criticized as too
liberal.4 5 Section 406 requires that disclaimers of implied warranties
must be conspicuous,406 which is similar to the UCC requirement.4 °
The UCITA definition,40 8 however, weakens the language and would
allow terms to "not be disclosed clearly."4" For example, the UCITA
definition does not consider the context in which the disclosure is
given.41° Therefore, a disclaimer within "boilerplate license text or...
396. Michele C. Kane, The Great Software Acquisition Race: The Perilous Journey
of Licensees in the Land of UCITA, in PLI Course Handbook, PLI's Sixth Annual
Institute for Intellectual Property Law (2000), avaialable at WL 617 PLI/Pat 655, 687-
88 [hereinafter Kane, Great Software]; Kaner, supra note 16, at 29.
397. See Kane, Great Software, supra note 396, at 687.
398. Id. at 687-88.
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28 (noting impact of UCITA on consumers).
402. Id. (noting that "[s]oftware products are complex. Customers often buy them
in reliance on demonstrations made by sales[]people at stores and trade shows.").
403. Cem Kaner & David L. Pels, Before the Federal Trade Commission, In the
Matter of High Technology Warranty Project, FTC File No. P994413 (Sept. 11, 2000),
http://www.badsoftware.com/ftc2000.htm.
404. See id. (noting that customers "express disbelief, distrust, or anger" when
confronted with legal excuses for software failure).
405. See Kaner, supra note 16, at 27 (noting that UCITA would allow the
enforcement of post-sale disclaimers).
406. U.C.I.T.A § 406(b)(1)(A) (2000).
407. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2000).
408. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(14).
409. See Letter from Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Competition and the
Policy Planning Office of the FTC, to John L. McClaugherty, Chair, Executive
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(July 9, 1999), at http://www.ftc.govlbe/v990010.htm.
410. Id. at n.6.
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printed on one of... [several] leaflets enclosed within a software box"
would be conspicuous under UCITA's liberal provisions.4"
Furthermore, UCITA's authorization of post-sale licenses means
that the disclaimer will not be conspicuous at the time of purchase"
Simply put, the conspicuousness requirement only extends to the
actual document containing the disclaimer; the consumer will be
unaware of the disclaimer until after the sale. 13
Critics also argue that UCITA's right of refund is illusory."'
Section 112(e) provides that if the licensee does not agree to the terms
of a shrink-wrap license he can return the product for a refund.4 5
Opponents note that the average consumer will not read the terms
and even if he did, he would not try to get a refund. 16 Additionally,
the majority of consumers believe the transaction ends at the time of
sale.417 Thus, the existence of a refund right becomes a moot point.41"
UCITA would also remove software from the reach of the
Warranty Act by defining a transaction in computer information as a
license. 19 The Warranty Act applies to written warranties on tangible
personal property.420 Therefore, if a software purchase is really only
the purchase of a license, a consumer has not acquired a tangible
good.421 Currently, no clear consensus exists regarding the Warranty
Act's application to software.41 The trend, however, has been to
recognize its applicability in software transactions.4u3 It would seem
that UCITA bypasses this emerging consensus by defining software
transactions as licenses.424 The impact of such a reading would be
harmful to consumers.4" For example, consumers would not enjoy
the Warranty Act's provisions requiring warranty terms to be
presented pre-sale or its prohibition of disclaimers of implied
warranties.42
411. Id.
412. Kaner, supra note 16, at 27.
413. Id.
414. Stephen Y. Chow, Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act:
Critical Structural Flaws and Policy Issues, at
http://www.2bguide.com/docs/CITmemW.doc at 2.1.
415. U.C.I.T.A. § 112(e)(3) (2000).
416. Chow, supra note 414, at 2.1.
417. Id.
41& See id.
419. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28.
420. Zammit, supra note 37, at 151-52.
421. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28.
422. See supra notes 313-26 and accompanying text.
423. Id.
424. Kaner, supra note 16, at 28.
425. Kaner & Pels, supra note 403 (discussing impact of classifying software outside
the scope of Magnuson-Moss).
426. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1994).
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UCITA's opt-in clause would also extend the statute's unfavorable
warranty terms to transactions normally outside of its scope.4 27
Section 104 provides that a vendor can opt-in to UCITA if a material
part of the transaction involves "computer information. 4 28 Computer
information is defined as "information in... a form capable of being
processed by a computer. 429 UCITA, therefore, could be extended to
cover the sale of a computer system that would normally be classified
as a sale of goods within the purview of Article 2 of the UCC.430
Other more mundane goods could also find themselves taken out of
Article 2's scope and placed within UCITA's purview.43' For
example, "cars, television sets, cameras," etc., could all possibly be
brought within UCITA's pro-industry warranty structure. 432 All that
is required for UCITA to be opted into is that computer information
comprises some part of the transaction.433  This would allow
commercial entities to apply the consumer unfriendly UCITA
provisions to transactions currently governed by other statutes such as
the UCC and the Warranty Act.
2. UCITA Will Make The Application of Warranty Law Confusing
Critics also assert that the addition of new warranties and terms in
UCITA only serves to make the application of warranty law
needlessly confusing.'" First, UCITA does not provide for an implied
warranty of merchantability for the informational content in a
computer program.435 Informational content is "information that is
intended to be... perceived by an individual in the ordinary use of
the information." '436 Critics charge that this definition is vague, and
will lead to uncertainty in distinguishing between what is a computer
program and therefore warranted, and what is merely informational
content.4 37 For example, if a consumer uses an online navigational
427. Letter from members of the Working Group on Consumer Protection,
American Bar Association Business Law Section, Committee on the Law of
Cyberspace, Subcommittee on Electronic Commerce (Co-chairs Jean Braucher and
Mark Budnitz), to President Gene Lebrun and Other Commissioners of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Chicago, Illinois (June 10,
1999) [hereinafter Lebrun] at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/jbmb699.html.
428. U.C.I.T.A. § 104 (2000).
429. Id. § 102(a)(10).
430. Lebrun, supra note 427, at § 3 ("This provision threatens to swallow up the
law of goods and undermine Revised Article 2.").
431. Id. (noting that any transaction if it involves computer information could
potentially be opted-in to UCITA).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See generally infra notes 435-52 and accompanying text (discussing the
ambiguities presented by the UCITA language).
435. U.C.I.T.A. § 403(c) (2000).
436. Id. § 102(a)(37).
437. See Michele C. Kane, When is a Computer Program Not a Computer
Program? The Perplexing World Created by Proposed U. C. C. Article 2B, 13 Berkeley
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program the warranty of merchantability would not extend to the
information he can see."a Additionally, if the animation of the
characters in a video game seems jerky, whether the defect was part of
the program or in the informational content would become a
dispositive question for the trier of fact.439
UCITA does offer an implied warranty of accuracy for
informational content in section 404.1° This warranty, however,
applies only to licensees who have a special relationship of reliance
with the licensor." 1  Thus, the average consumer who buys "mass
market or other off-the-shelf software" will be unable to avail himself
of this warranty's protection. 2
UCITA's distinction between informational content and published
informational content is also troublesome. PIC is defined as
informational content that is "prepared for or made available ... to a
class of recipientsl] in substantially the same form. ' 3  Typical
examples of PIC are "digital newsletters, multimedia encyclopedias,
and on-line databases."'  This information is generally protected in
print media from tort liability. 5 UCITA extends this protection to
PIC that makes its way into computer information transactions. No
implied warranties arise with respect to PIC. 7
This exemption from warranty coverage is "potentially
overbroad." 8  For example, this exclusion could be used to shield
"user manuals... upon which customers must rely" from liability."9
In addition, even basic components of a computer program, such as
the user interface, may be classified as PIC.'- Because the user
interface in an off-the-shelf program is presented to all recipients in
substantially the same form, it is arguably PIC.45' Consequently, the
Tech. L.J. 1013, 1017 (1998) [hereinafter Kane, Perplexing World]; see also Kane,
Great Software, supra note 396, at 688 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing the
informational content from the program itself).
438. Kane, Great Softvare, supra note 396, at 688.
439. Kane, Perplexing World, supra note 437, at 1018.
440. U.C.I.T.A. § 404(a).
441. Id
442. Kane, Perplexing World, supra note 437, at 1019.
443. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(52).
444. Shah, supra note 3, at 95.
445. Id.
446. Id
447. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 403, 404(b)(1), 405(b)(2).
448. Shah, supra note 3, at 96.
449. Kane, Perplexing World, supra note 437, at 1019-20.
450. See id. at 1018 (explaining that a reasonable interpretation of PIC could
include any perceivable portions of a computer program); Letter from Barbara
Simons, Association for Computing Machinery, to Uniform Law Commissioner, (July
12, 1999) at httpJ/www.acm.org/usacm/copyright/usacm-ucita.html (arguing that user
interfaces may be included under PIC and that such a reading would be a mistake).
451. See Kane, Perplexing World, supra note 437, at 1019.
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PIC exemption may be used as a means to avoid liability for product
defects.452
Although many critics argue that UCITA should not be enacted for
the above-mentioned reasons, others support UCITA and believe that
it should be ratified. Two main groups are pressing for the adoption
of UCITA453-industry insiders and, naturally enough, the statute's
drafters.454
C. The Proponent's View
The arguments for adopting UCITA can be grouped into two basic
categories: (1) opponents of the statute misunderstand its provisions;
and (2) the reasons for enacting UCITA necessitate its passage.
UCITA proponents commonly contend that the statute was not
intended to be a piece of consumer protection legislation.4 5 It is
instead a commercial code,456 modeled after the UCC, that acts as a
gap-filler.457  Therefore, the statute provides a background for
contractual agreements, but does not mandate their outcome.458 Thus,
proponents argue that complaints from critics concerning the statute's
perceived lack of consumer protections are misplaced.459
Furthermore, they argue that the variations in state consumer
protection laws make it difficult to design a uniform law.460  The
responsibility for updating and clarifying consumer protection laws
"on a uniform or on a local basis is a task that transcends computer
information commerce and should be addressed on that broader
basis. '1 4 1
Arguably, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is such a piece of
legislation. In response to criticism that UCITA removes computer
information transactions from the scope of the Warranty Act,
Reporter Ray Nimmer has argued that UCITA cannot alter the reach
of federal consumer law.462 Indeed, he contends that whether the
Warranty Act applies to computer information transactions is a
"federal law question."463 Thus, if a court were to determine that the
452. Shah, supra note 3, at 96.
453. David A. P. Neboyskey, A Leap Forward: Why States Should Ratify The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 793, 808-13
(2000) (discussing the sources of support for UCITA).
454. Id. at 808-11.
455. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 14.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 4-5.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 14-15.
460. See id. at 15.
461. Id.
462. Id. (explaining that "the scope of consumer law is defined by that law; UCITA
does not alter that scope").
463. Id.
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Warranty Act applies to software pre-UCITA, then it would apply to
software post-UCITA.4  Other proponents have argued that the
Warranty Act was never meant to cover computer information
transactions at all and therefore should not be extended to UCITA's
realm.465
UCITA's proponents have also argued that the cost of additional
statutory consumer protections is more than the market is willing to
bear.' They charge that supplementing UCITA with provisions that
provide broader rights and warranties will force vendors to sell their
products at a higher cost. 7  This, they argue, will make software
inaccessible to those who cannot afford the higher prices.' They
further contend that increased liability will also force small developers
who cannot afford the additional costs out of business, thus decreasing
innovation and competition within the computer industry.'
Additionally, applications that are not profitable at higher prices will
stop being sold.47 Thus, UCITA's proponents argue that the
increased rights and protections lobbied for by UCITA critics will
harm, not help, consumers.7
The criticisms of UCITA's express warranty provisions have
focused mainly on changes made to the creation of warranties by
demonstration.4' UCITA advocates respond that these changes are
necessary to update the law to reflect the new business
environment.4 73  In a non-computer information transaction, the
demonstration of a product can have a higher correlation with the end
result.474 For example, a taste sample of cheese in a grocery store
gives a reliable indication of what the rest of the cheese will taste
464. See id. (noting that the scope of the Warranty Act is determined by the courts
and thus cannot be changed by UCITA).
465. Fred H. Miller (Executive Director of the NCCUSL), Speaking Frankly About
UCCArticle2B, 37 UCC Bulletin 1 (Mar. 1999) ("These laws all were developed fora
far different form of subject matter, and a good fit is more chance than wisdom.").
466. Micalyn S. Harris, Is UCITA Worthy of Active Support?, at
http://www.2bguide.com/docs/mh1099.html (last visited on Dec. 1. 2000).
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id-
471. Id.
472. See supra notes 383-94 and accompanying text (discussing the insertion of
restrictive language like "reasonable person" and limiting warranties to "final"
products).
473. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 16 ("Although some have argued that this
reduces customer protections, a reasonable reading of the reported cases would show
that they follow this same, common-sense approach."); see also Jeff C. Dodd & Brian
Martin, A Preliminary Analysis of Certain Default Rules in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, in supra note 161, The UCITA Revolution, at 379, 403
("So, with information products courts should be especially mindful of what is truly
and fairly being illustrated.").
474. Dodd & Martin, supra note 473, at 403 (contrasting a test sample in a grocery
with the demonstration of an "intricate application program").
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like.475 A demonstration of a computer program, however, may only
illustrate the "general functionality" of the program, "not its capacity
or performance."476 Reporter Ray Nimmer gives the example of "a
demonstration of a database system using 10 files for that purpose
creates an express warranty, but the performance that is to be
expected when the system handles 1 million files may not be the exact
same as the demonstration. 477
With respect to implied warranties, UCITA's critics charge that the
statute makes the application of the law confusing by introducing
concepts like PIC.478  UCITA's proponents respond that the
distinction drawn between PIC and the rest of a computer program is
necessary to support freedom of speech.4 79 Unlike normal sales of
goods, computer information may involve First Amendment issues. 80
For example, software is composed of lines of code that enable it to
run and process information, but it also contains information intended
to be perceived by the user, which is therefore the equivalent of books
and magazines. 1 The information in books and magazines is usually
only subject to liability under tort law.4  If the entire computer
program were subject to the same warranty laws, publishers would
have to extend warranty protection to information that normally
would not receive it, 3 which would create an excessive risk of liability
and potentially hamper the computer industry's development.4' 8 To
prevent this, UCITA provides that PIC is not subject to implied
warranty laws.485 Instead, liability is based on rules found in tort law
principles. 6
In response to accusations by critics that UCITA makes it easier to
disclaim warranties, proponents have pointed out that UCITA retains
many of the protections provided by the UCC.4  For example,
UCITA follows Article 2 by requiring that disclaimers of implied
475. See id.
476. Id.
477. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 16.
478. See supra notes 443-52 and accompanying text.
479. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that computer information "call[s]
into play political and social values associated with free speech interests").
480. Id.
481. See id.
482. Id. (describing that a common law tort cause of action exists in most states
with respect to informational content).
483. Id.
484. Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. & Raymond T. Nimmer, Series of Papers on UCITA
Issues, at http://www.nccusl.org/uniformact-qanda/uniformacts-q-ucita.htm (last
visited on Dec. 1, 2000).
485. Id. UCITA does, however, provide an implied warranty for informational
content if the licensor and licensee have a special relationship of reliance. See
U.C.I.T.A. § 404 (2000).
486. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 9 ("UCITA adopts the rule under common
law in most states with respect to printed forms of this type of information content.").
487. Id. at 16.
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warranties be conspicuous and that express warranties generally
cannot be disclaimed.' Furthermore, in response to the argument
that shrink-wrap licensing essentially defeats the purpose of the
conspicuousness requirement, UCITA proponents note that the
customer is still protected from unreasonable terms.' If the terms of
a shrink-wrap license are oppressive, UCITA provides courts with the
power to invalidate those terms through the doctrines of
unconscionability, good faith, and public policy."' Additionally, the
consumer is provided the right of a refund if he decides not to accept
the terms of the license.4 91 Finally, UCITA proponents note that
shrink-wrap licenses are a normal part of business that are accepted
by the courts. 92
In response to criticism that UCITA's opt-in provision would
remove normal Article 2 transactions (e.g., the sale of hardware,
televisions, cars) from existing consumer protection statutes (state
laws and Magnuson-Moss), UCITA proponents argue that critics have
overstated the threat. First, they note that section 104 places several
restrictions on UCITA's ability to supplant other law."' For example,
entering the contract into UCITA cannot alter the applicability of a
consumer protection statute or any other rule that normally cannot be
varied by agreement.4' Additionally, the entire transaction would still
have to withstand the legal doctrines of unconscionability,
fundamental public policy, and good faith.495 As to the claim that the
opt-in provision would "swallow up the law of goods and undermine
Revised Article 2," UCITA advocates note that the statute is
inapplicable unless there is computer information in the transaction,
and that information is a material purpose of the transaction 9
Many of the people who have criticized UCITA agree that some
sort of uniform law is required. As previously noted, the current law
governing computer information transactions is a loose combination
of common law and UCC.491 Proponents of the statute argue that this
uncertainty is a compelling reason for UCITA's passage" The
488. Id at 17.
489. Donald A. Cohn & Mary Jo Dively, The Need For a More Objective Look at
the Myths of the Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, at
http://www.2bguide.com/docs/myths.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2000).
490. Id.
491. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 208,202(e) (2000).
492. Cohn & Dively, supra note 489; Ring & Nimmer, supra note 484.
493. Letter from Members of the Subcomittee on Information Contracting of the
Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association Section of
Business Law, to President Gene N. Lebrun and other Commissioners, NCCUSL, at
http://www.2bguide.comdocs!7899bls.html (July 8, 1999).
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id
497. Nimmer, UCITA, supra note 7, at 5.
498. Id. at 5-6.
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alternative, they point out, is contract law that impedes instead of
supports commerce.499
UCITA, however, will not properly address the current ambiguity
in the law unless further changes are made to it that will provide
consumers greater protection. The following part presents a possible
solution to the UCITA controversy in the form of modifications to
UCITA and new federal legislation.
III. A THIRD WAY
This part argues that UCITA, in its current form, is unable to meet
the demands of the new economy because the statute does not take
into account consumer needs. As such, this part suggests that: (1)
individual state legislatures should amend the statute to provide
greater protection of consumer interests; and (2) Congress should
create sui generis legislation with respect to consumer protection
issues in computer information transactions.
Even if we are to believe all of the arguments articulated by
UCITA's proponents 00 the interpretive problems that will almost
certainly arise due to UCITA's often ambiguous language should
cause state legislatures to pause before deciding whether to pass the
statute. While the statute's stated purpose is a laudable one-to bring
uniformity to the law of computer information transactions- the cost
in terms of endless litigation between parties contesting UCITA's
often ambiguous language may be too high a price to pay.
In comparison to the meticulous drafting of the UCC, UCITA's
drafting process was an example of blitzkrieg legislation. 0' The UCC
was a synthesis of more than seventy years of business practices and
case law. 2 Unfortunately, UCITA's relatively quick compilation may
result in the codification of bad law. Furthermore, the computer
information industry is subject to constant and rapid changes.5 3 Thus,
rules that seem practical now may quickly cease to be useful and may
possibly become a hindrance to commerce.
Ideally, the statute should be sent back for further drafting or
modification to resolve the myriad problems identified by UCITA's
opponents. Because the legislation has already been passed in two
states and introduced in several others, however, it is likely that
UCITA, in one form or another, will eventually become law. A
potential compromise would be for the individual states to amend the
499. Id. at 6.
500. See supra Part II. C.
501. Thomas J. Murphy, Comment, It's Just Another Little Bit of History Repeating:
UCITA in the Evolving Age of Information, 30 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 559, 573
(2000).
502. Id. Waiting until the law is settled avoids the problem of codifying sub-
optimal practices and case law. See id.
503. Id. at 574.
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statute and remedy deficiencies when and where they arise." This
would allow for the creation of a relatively uniform body of law, but
would still address consumer protection concerns.
To date, only Virginia and Maryland have passed UCITA.2  The
Virginia legislature adopted UCITA without making any substantive
changes to its provisions."° They delayed, however, enforcement of
UCITA until July 2001. 507 Conversely, Maryland's version of UCITA
has been effective law since October 1, 2 00 0.s50 The Maryland version
of the bill has undergone several modifications,5°9 many of which were
praised by consumer groups for addressing some of their concerns.""
The most important of these changes, and most significant to this
Note, is the invalidation of disclaimers of implied warranties in
consumer contracts.
The Maryland legislature's modifications to UCITA represent a
model for other states to follow when adopting UCITA. Maryland's
approach, however, is only a beginning. States should go further in
exercising the considerable discretion left to them. For example, state
legislatures should amend several of UCITA's provisions to create a
distinction between consumer transactions and business to business
transactions with respect to warranties.
Distinguishing consumer transactions from other types of
commerce makes sense for several reasons. A commercial statute that
deals with both consumers and businesses the same way requires
drafting rules that "apply with equal facility-and equal justice-to
this wide range of transactions." ' Situations exist, however, where
an undifferentiated rule may be unadvisable. For example, the
extremely liberal disclaimer of implied warranties might be welcomed
in business transactions, 12 but this change would be less welcome in
the "consumer context. '51 3  Because of these compromises, the
resulting legislation may be inadequate for both consumers and
businesses.
Additionally, distinguishing between consumers and businesses
would avoid later legal ambiguities. For example, consumer status,
even if not recognized by statute, is often an important factor in
504. S. Keith Moulsdale & Steven E. Tiller, UCITA Spells Controversy, 33 Md. BJ.
23, 25-26 (2000) (noting that the version of UCITA passed by the Maryland
legislature underwent several changes, many of which were related to consumer
protection issues).
505. Id. at 23.
506. Id.
507. Id
508. Id
509. Itt
510. Id
511. Kathleen Patchel & Amelia H. Boss, Consumer Transactions and the Code:
Some Considerations, 51 Bus. Law. 1343, 1353 (1996).
512 Id at 1354.
513. Id
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judicial opinions. 14  In these situations, statutory language is
manipulated to achieve the desired result in the interests of justice.5
Unfortunately, this judicial manipulation can cause uncertainty when
"it is unclear to what extent the court's decision is based on the
consumer nature of the transaction. 516
Once a distinction is made, provisions that consumer groups find
objectionable can be shifted to affect only business transactions. An
example of this approach can be found in the proposed revisions to
Article 2 of the UCC, which attempts to incorporate consumer
provisions in addition to business to business provisions.5 7 Article 2
has been in a revision process for more than a decade now.1
Originally slated to be released in 1997,519 the statute has been
repeatedly delayed. Consumer issues have proven to be a rather large
obstacle. The Article 2 drafters realized that if the statute was to
"have a chance of rapid and uniform enactment" it would have to
include consumer protective provisions. 52 UCITA's authors would
have done well to follow their careful approach.
A necessary first step in this direction would be to make the implied
warranty of merchantability undisclaimable in the consumer context.
Several reasons support this action. First, unlike sophisticated
commercial entities, consumers are unable to negotiate the terms in
typical computer information transactions.521 Consumers, instead, are
presented with adhesion contracts,522 which are, by definition, "take it
or leave it" propositions.523 For example, the typical mass-market
software transaction between a consumer and publisher involves the
consumer buying a ready-made product with terms attached to it that
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 1355.
517. Fred H. Miller (Executive Director of the NCCUSL), Consumer Provisions in
the Revised UCC, 53 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 95, 95 (1999).
518. Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 39, 79 (1996) (noting that the original process began in 1987).
519. Id. at 39.
520. Miller, supra note 517, at 95 (showing that "earlier efforts" in New York and
California, presumably with fewer consumer protections, demonstrated the need for
favorable provisions).
521. See Sandra J. Levin, Comment, Examining Restraints on Freedom to Contract
as an Approach to Purchaser Dissatisfaction in the Computer Industry, 74 Cal. L. Rev.
2101, 2121-23 (1986).
522. Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-
Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 319, 335 n.97 (1999)
(noting that consumers in software transactions are usually presented with adhesion
contracts).
523. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 1.4, at 13-14 (1993).
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cannot be varied.524 A commercial entity, on the other hand, can
negotiate with the software publisher for more favorable terms.51
To a certain extent, adhesion contracts are necessary because it
would be infeasible for businesses to negotiate individual contracts
with each and every consumer.52 The cost (manpower, increased
price of product, etc.) would quickly outweigh any benefit z' It is
possible, however, to make the standard contract that consumers
receive more protective. In this respect an undisclaimable warranty of
merchantability would be advisable. Because the warranty of
merchantability forces publishers to meet a certain standard of quality
in their products,5" its mandatory inclusion in consumer computer
information purchases would provide a minimum "floor" below which
products will not be able to sink.
The average consumer is likely oblivious to the existence of these
warranties and probably does not notice whether the warranties come
with the software being purchased. Consumers, however, regardless
of their knowledge of the law, do expect the products they buy to
meet certain standards. 9 In this respect, computer information
transactions are no different from transactions involving other
products.530 Customers, therefore, will expect softvare to have the
same warranty rights they have come to expect from other products.5 31
UCITA's warranty structure fails to meet these reasonable
consumer expectations. With respect to the implied warranties, it
allows for liberal disclaimer,532 and because it makes no caveat for
consumers, the disclaimer effectively limits a right that consumers
currently enjoy.533 Furthermore, because it is unclear both whether
the Warranty Act applies to softwarel and whether UCITA actually
pulls software out of the scope of the Warranty Act,5 35 consumers may
be unable to avail themselves of that statute's protections.
UCITA's lack of protection in this regard becomes more troubling
because software is routinely shipped with known defects ("bugs").",
524. Goodman, supra note 522, at 335 n.97.
525. Levin, supra note 521, at 2121-22.
526. Perillo, supra note 523, § 1.4, at 15.
527. Id.
528. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
529. See Kaner & Pels, supra note 403.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. See supra notes 371-80 and accompanying text.
533. See supra notes 405-13 and accompanying text (noting that the UCITA
provisions are weaker than existing law).
534. See supra notes 313-26 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 419-26, 462-65 and accompanying text (noting the conflicting
views on the applicability of the Warranty Act to computer information and whether
UCITA and the Warranty Act are mutually exclusive).
536. Cem Kaner & David L. Pels, Article 2B and Software Customer
Dissatisfaction: Prepared for the UCC Article 2B Drafting Committee, at
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The nature of computer software makes it impossible to "test a
program completely" before shipping it.537 The presence of bugs in a
computer program, therefore, is not in and of itself indicative of poor
manufacturing processes. 38 Manufacturers should, however, be
incentivized to limit the presence of such bugs. As previously
mentioned, the UCC implied warranty of merchantability requires
sellers to ensure that their products are "merchantable '539 and would
"pass without objection in the trade.""4  The threat of the ensuing
litigation if software fails to meet this standard would encourage
software publishers to improve the quality of their products, and thus
force them to limit the amount of software bugs.
Regarding the express warranty, UCITA's weakening of the
warranty in the demonstration/model context will only serve to
frustrate consumers. The following scenario illustrates the problem:
A consumer enters a store (either virtual or real) to buy a software
program. In the store, the consumer observes the live demonstration
of that program. Impressed with the software's abilities he buys the
program. In this scenario, the consumer has made his purchase based
on representations made by the publisher. Under UCITA, however,
the circumstances under which these representations led to the
creation of an express warranty have been severely limited.54 If the
consumer relies upon the demonstration, UCITA introduces a myriad
of obstacles to the creation of an express warranty? 42 Consumers,
however, rightfully expect manufacturers "to stand behind statements
of fact that their representatives make at trade shows or in other face-
to-face product demonstrations." 3
UCITA's express warranty by demonstration should be modified to
follow the UCC's Article 2 provisions. This change would remove the
restrictions currently in place and provide consumers with greater
certainty in their purchases. The objections from UCITA's
proponents' that removing the restrictions will cause excessive liability
are misplaced. Reporter Ray Nimmer refers us to the example of a
demonstration for a database system that can handle ten files being
subverted into a warranty for a system with a one million-file
capacity.5" The proponents, however, have overstated their case.
http://www.badsoftware.com/stats.htm (May 27, 1997); Levin, supra note 521, at 2101.
537. Kaner & Pels, supra note 536.
538. See id.
539. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the merchantability
requirement).
540. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing the pass without
objection in the trade standard).
541. See supra notes 383404 and accompanying text (discussing how the UCITA
provisions have weakened the express warranty).
542. See supra notes 383-404 and accompanying text.
543. Kaner & Pels, supra note 403.
544. See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
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Even the current UCC Article 2 provisions, which are far more
consumer friendly than UCITA's provisions, would not allow for the
kind of abuses Professor Nimmer discusses.-" If the database is being
presented as one that can adequately handle 10, 100, or 1000 files,
then that is the warranty being made by the manufacturer. Unless the
manufacturer misleads the consumer into believing the database
system can actually handle more files than were being demonstrated,
there is no reason to believe the express warranty would be extended.
UCITA's lack of consumer protection is especially troublesome
considering the rising consumer dissatisfaction with the computer
industry. In 1995, "computers and software ranked #8 in the Top 10
list for complaints to the Better Business Bureau, outdoing such
historically reputable businesses as used car dealers." -  Consumers
often express dissatisfaction over the presence of bugs in their
software programs or the duplicity of manufacturers who make "sky-
high claims in their advertising," but fail to back up those assertions
with warranties. 7 UCITA's pro-vendor provisions will worsen this
already egregious situation. For example, disclaimable implied
warranties and watered down express warranties represent a step
backwards in consumer rights in an industry that has historically
mistreated consumers.
When state legislatures consider adopting UCITA, they should
amend the statute to ensure that at the very least, its effects on
consumers are no more unfavorable than the law that preceded it.
Unfortunately, states by themselves will be unable to fix all of
UCITA's present ambiguities. Even if they could, the resulting
document would have undergone considerable change that would
compromise the statute's uniformity. It is in this regard that UCITA's
case is strongest; the disarray in the status quo begs for uniformity. As
an increasingly interconnected global nation moves into an
information economy, it is unacceptable for computer information
transactions to be governed in different ways in multiple jurisdictions.
For example, depending on where one currently makes a software
transaction, such a transfer may or not be considered a good covered
by the UCC, express warranties are or are not disclaimable,19 and
merchantability may or may not be an applicable standard for
computer information.55 The threat of non-uniformity, however,
should not hold state legislatures hostage when considering the
545. See White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-6. at 509-10 (describing how not all
representations create an express warranty and that "[whether something is a model
depends partly upon the words spoken by the parties to the transaction").
546. Kaner & Pels, supra note 536.
547. Levin, supra note 521, at 2101-02.
548. See supra notes 40-74 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 113-57 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 187-222 and accompanying text.
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adoption of UCITA. In evaluating the statute, the legislatures' first
concern must be UCITA's impact on their consumer constituencies.
In addition to the changes state legislatures should make to
UCITA, Congress should adopt consumer protection legislation
specifically drafted for computer information transactions.
Legislation at the federal level avoids the rancor and strife associated
with coordinating "uniform" laws in fifty different jurisdictions. It has
been suggested that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act should be
extended to computer information transactions. 51  Currently, the
Warranty Act extends to all written consumer product warranties. 2
The uncertainty in the status quo stems from the Warranty Act's
definition of consumer products as "tangible personal property." '553
To broaden the Warranty Act's scope, the definition of consumer
products must be expanded by either defining tangible personal
property to include computer information or by making computer
information a separate category covered by the Act.
Both of these options are unattractive 54 because they would extend
legislation that was drafted almost thirty years ago to situations it was
never designed to address. The changes in the economy require a
federal consumer protection statute that encompasses computer
information transactions to be sui generis. To that effect, such federal
legislation should contain the following warranty provisions:
1. This Act will extend to computer information transactions
that are intended primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. [This provision would restrict the Act's
applicability to consumers. Businesses would remain free to
negotiate terms under UCITA's provisions.]
2. Computer information transactions shall include but not be
limited to the sale of computer information and the licensing
of computer information. [This provision allows the
551. Rustad, supra note 15, at 588 (arguing for the extension of the Warranty Act
to computer information transactions); see also Cem Kaner, Software Engineering and
UCITA, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 435, 459-62 (1999) (noting UCITA
pulls software outside the scope of Magnuson-Moss and that this is undesirable).
552. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
553. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. The uncertainty in the tangibility
requirement is similar to the earlier discussion about whether software is a good. See
supra notes 40-74 and accompanying text.
554. For example, even if the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was extended to
computer information transactions, the problem of UCITA's watered down express
warranty by demonstration would still exist, because the Warranty Act only applies to
the seller's written statements. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A)-(B) (1994).
Furthermore, the Warranty Act's express warranty provisions are less encompassing
than the UCC. White & Summers, supra note 75, § 9-15, at 546 ("[Wjhat may be an
express warranty under 2-313 is not necessarily an express warranty under the
Magnuson-Moss Act."). Thus, merely extending the Warranty Act would not solve
the problems associated with UCITA.
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legislation to adapt to methods of transacting computer
information that have not yet been created.]
3. This Act will apply only to those computer information
transactions that contain a written warranty from the
manufacturer. In the event the transaction in question does
not contain any such warranty this Act shall not apply,
however, the manufacturer must indicate the absence of
such warranties in conspicuous (using the UCC definition of
the term) and unmistakable language. [This provision
would enable a manufacturer to avoid compliance with the
Act, but only if it did not issue any warranty whatsoever.
Furthermore, the provision would force the manufacturer to
give notice of the absence of warranties to the consumer.]
4. Computer information intended to be used by a consumer
as a software program must perform as stated in the
supplier's advertising and or product packaging. Such
advertising and packaging creates an express warranty. For
the purposes of online transactions the product descriptions
supplied by the supplier shall be considered advertising.
[This provision forces manufacturers to stand behind tie
claims they make in product advertising.55"]
5. Any demonstration of a product by a supplier or its licensed
dealer creates an express warranty based on that
demonstration. [This provision would avoid UCITA's harsh
modifications"56 to the express warranty by demonstration.]
6. No manufacturer or publisher may disclaim or modify any
implied warranties with respect to a computer information
transaction if the transaction is covered by this Act. [This
provision ensures consumers, at a mninimun, will have the
protection of any implied warranties." ]
7 The implied warranties shall extend to informational
content but not published informational content. UCITA
provides no warranties for PIC. This Act will retain that
limitation. Thus, the express warranties and undisclaimable
implied warranties provided above do not apply with
respect to PIC. [This provision ensures PIC will not be
subject to any additional liabilities beyond those already
imposed by tort law.558]
555. See supra notes 401-04 and accompanying text (discussing consumer
dissatisfaction with software publishers).
556. See supra notes 383-400 and accompanying text (explaining the effect of
UCITA's modifications on the express warranty by demonstration).
557. See supra notes 521-27 and accompanying text (discussing why the implied
warranty of merchantability should be disclaimable).
558. PIC raises First Amendment considerations that are beyond the scope of
warranty law. See supra notes 479-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
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Federal warranty law that contains the above provisions would
mitigate many of UCITA's harsher aspects with respect to warranty
law. State legislatures, however, should also modify UCITA before
ratifying it to ensure it adequately addresses consumer needs. By
making these changes at both the state and federal level, the
government could bring some badly needed uniformity to the law of
computer information transactions while also protecting consumer
interests.
CONCLUSION
Consumers make purchases on a daily basis and often comparison
shop based on features, price, reputation, or other factors. One
factor, however, that almost never enters a consumer's mind (even a
legal mind) is whether the product has express or implied warranties
and what the terms of those warranties are. Nonetheless, consumers
expect manufacturers to stand behind their products and claims.
Thus, warranty provisions, though they go unnoticed, are an
important part of commercial transactions.
Similarly, uniformity in the law is also an important factor in
commercial transactions. From either a business or consumer
viewpoint, uniformity is favored because it avoids uncertainty,
decreases transaction costs, and makes for a more stable business
environment. Computer information transactions is an area of the law
badly in need of such uniformity.
America's transition from an industrial to an information economy
necessitates legislation that reflects this change. Unfortunately,
UCITA sacrifices fairness to consumers in its warranty provisions in
favor of achieving uniformity, which is a price that is too high to pay.
It remains to be seen both whether UCITA will be adopted by the
remaining forty-eight states and in what form it will pass. Regardless
of its ultimate fate, the UCITA controversy highlights the uncertain
nature of computer information transactions law and the need for new
legislation that effectively balances the need for uniformity with
consumer interests.
PIC should not be warranted.
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